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Summary 
 
We investigate three distinct ‘bridges’ between companies’ ownership characteristics 
and innovation. 
In the first chapter, we take an exploratory empirical approach to investigate the effect 
of going public on the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio. We 
argue that an IPO is a life-changing event that encompasses many changes that concur 
to impact the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio. However, we 
expect that an IPO is a more severe event for companies that were originated as new 
and independent entities, and remain independent till the IPO event – emerging 
growth companies – than it is for other companies – non-emerging growth companies. 
We find that going public does not affect the risk-reward characteristics of non-
emerging companies. For emerging growth companies we find that the risk-reward 
characteristics of the innovation portfolio are: positively impacted by going public; 
and, negatively impacted by the percentage of shares offered at the IPO. 
In the second chapter, we investigate pharmaceuticals’ decision between acquiring 
and allying with a biotechnological, after recombinant DNA. The discovery of R-
DNA represented an R&D competence-destroying event for incumbent 
pharmaceutical companies. As a response to that, organizational deals – namely, 
strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions – have been extensively used as 
external sources of knowledge. We examine a potential determinant of 
pharmaceuticals’ decision between these two alternatives: the width of applicability 
of the internal knowledge of the biotechnological company. We find compelling 
evidence that it has a positive effect on the likelihood that the pharmaceutical 
company acquires (or merges with) that biotechnological company. 
In the third chapter, we examine the impact of SOX Section 404 on long-term 
investment of small innovative companies. We hypothesise that R&D intensity 
increases the impact of SOX 404 on long-term investment. Making use of a quasi-
natural experiment, our results suggest that the impact of SOX Section 404 on 
companies’ long-term investment is uneven, favouring R&D intensive companies. 
This may call for a re-centring of policy discussion around the distribution of the net 
benefit of coercive financial disclosure programs versus the overall economic impact 
of those programs.  
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ABSTRACT 
We take an exploratory empirical approach to investigate the effect of going public on 
the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio. We argue that an IPO is a 
life-changing event that encompasses many changes that concur to impact the risk-
reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio. However, we expect that an IPO is 
a more severe event for companies that were originated as new and independent 
entities, and remain independent till the IPO event – emerging growth companies – 
than it is for other companies – non-emerging growth companies. We find that going 
public does not affect the risk-reward characteristics of non-emerging companies. For 
emerging growth companies we find that the risk-reward characteristics of the 
innovation portfolio are: positively impacted by going public; and, negatively 
impacted by the percentage of shares offered at the IPO. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Does going public affect the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio? A 
few relevant statements suggest that it might. Regarding the IPO possibility, 
Facebook’s founder stated: “I tend to think that being private is better for us right 
now because of some of the big risks we want to take in developing new products. 
[…] The experience of managing the company through launching controversial 
services is tricky, but I can only imagine it would be even more difficult if we had a 
public stock price bouncing around. There are a lot more new things left to build […] 
and I’d rather focus on building them than on going public right now”1. On another 
example,! Google’s 2004 Founders' IPO Letter2 addresses concerns regarding the 
changes on the innovation strategy driven by the emergence of conflict of interests: 
“We will not shy away from high-risk, high-reward projects because of short-term 
earnings pressure. Some of our past bets have gone extraordinarily well, and others 
have not. Because we recognize the pursuit of such projects as the key to our long-
term success, we will continue to seek them out. […] We will support selected high-
risk, high-reward projects and manage our portfolio of projects.” Regarding 
Google’s prospectus, Larry Page3 argued, “many companies are under pressure to 
keep their earnings in line with analysts’ forecast. Therefore, they often accept 
smaller, but predictable, earnings rather than larger and more unpredictable returns. 
Sergey and I feel this is harmful, and we intend to steer in the opposite direction.”  
Changes in innovation investment decisions seem to be a major concern. Yet, the 
analysis of how an IPO impacts innovation investment decisions is challenging for 
several reasons. First, an IPO is a major financing decision that impacts companies in 
multiple ways [Pagano et al. (1998)], many of which concurring to impact innovation, 
possibly in opposing directions [Wu (2012)]. Second, an IPO impacts companies 
distinctively, depending on whether or not the company is originated as new and 
independent entity, and remained independent till the IPO event [Pagano et al. 
(1998)]4. Third, going public can either affect the level of innovation efforts and/or it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 www.businessinsider.com. 
2 From the S-1 Registration Statement.!The content of the S-1 form is critical for any potential shareholder to decide whether or 
not to take part in a particular IPO. Insiders share information and manifest their intentions and interests, which is highly 
valuable in a context of so highly asymmetric information. 
3 Co-founder of Google, alongside with Sergey Brin. 
4 Hereafter we designate these companies as emerging growth companies (EGC). Non-emerging growth companies (NEGC) 
engaged in an IPO are typically divisions or subsidiaries of large diversified public companies. Divesture does not necessarily 
involve an IPO, although it does in many cases [Draho (2004)]. 
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can impact the type of innovation efforts. This is because the fundamental differences 
between innovation and other more conventional investments – namely, innovative 
activities are harder to manage and communicate to outsiders, less tangible, have 
more uncertain and long-term returns – may also exist between innovative activities, 
and are the base for the development of empirical predictions. To illustrate, consider 
the following empirical prediction. By lowering owners’ tolerance for failure and 
increasing their focus on short-termism, going public is expected to decrease 
investment in projects that are typically long-term. One can argue that, since 
innovation is long-term (as compared with conventional projects), the level of 
innovation efforts would decrease. But we also could argue that the fundamental 
differences between innovation and conventional investment – namely, innovative 
activities are harder to manage and communicate to outsiders, less tangible, have 
more uncertain and long-term returns – can be observed within the innovation 
portfolio. As such, instead of affecting the level of innovation efforts, it could be that 
the type of innovation efforts would be impacted, through a higher investment in less 
conservative innovative projects relative to more conservative innovative projects.  
Accordingly, we assess both the impact of going public on the risk-reward 
characteristics of the innovation portfolio – which is associated with the type of 
innovation efforts – and on the overall reward of the innovation portfolio – which is 
associated with the level of innovation efforts. Yet, our main contribution is on 
assessing the former. 
Conceptually, we consider an innovation portfolio with higher risk as one with higher 
level of less conservative projects within the innovation portfolio – namely, an 
innovation portfolio with relatively more projects that are harder to manage and 
communicate to outsiders, less tangible and have more uncertain and long-term 
returns. We assume the reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio (and not the 
overall reward of innovation), to be associated with the risk of the innovation 
portfolio5. We are obviously close to the existing literature on the relation between 
IPO and innovation [Wu (2012)6; Aggarwal and Hsu (2014)7; and, Bernstein (2015)8]. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 To clarify the distinction between overall reward of innovation and reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio, consider 
the following scenario. Suppose a company decides to double its level of innovation efforts, without changing the type of 
innovation efforts. In this case, the overall reward of the innovation portfolio is expected to increase (perhaps, double), while the 
reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio is not impacted. 
6 It is a single-industry study (medical device). Finds negative impact on innovation quality, negative impact on exploration of 
new and recently developed knowledge and positive impact on exploration based in scientific knowledge. 
7 It is a single-industry study (biotech). Finds negative impact on innovation quality. 
8 It is a multi-industry study. Finds negative impact on innovation quality, negative impact on originality and no impact on 
generality. 
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Our research is closer to Wu (2012), and Bernstein (2015) because, as claimed before, 
we also inspect the characteristics of the innovation portfolio around the IPO. 
Bernstein (2015) investigates the impact of going public on generality and originality 
(in his designation, the fundamental nature of research). Wu (2012), on the other 
hand, investigates the impact on exploitation versus exploration. Our proposal is 
distinct from both and is closer to Wu (2012). Wu (2012) hypothesises on the 
proportion of exploratory search in the innovation portfolio based on the fundamental 
differences between exploitation and exploration – namely, relative to exploitation, 
returns from exploration are uncertain, distant and often negative [March (1991)]. 
We, on the other hand, are interested on the risk-reward characteristics of the 
innovation portfolio, which is operationalized by inspecting the project and time 
distribution of returns of the innovation portfolio – and these distributions, in turn, 
bases the distinctive features of exploitation/exploration. As such, besides 
complementing these proximate contributions – those that inspect the impact of going 
public on innovation – with novel evidence from a distinct dimension of innovation 
portfolio characterization, we believe this alternative approach to inspect innovation 
portfolio characteristics can be valuable for research streams that build upon the 
fundamental differences between innovation and other more conventional investments 
and/or the fundamental differences between exploitation and exploration. 
We argue that the risk-reward of the innovation portfolio reflects companies’ 
investment decisions, and that these are impacted by the IPO due to changes in 
companies’ financial constraints and investment preferences of their owners and 
possibly their managers (in the case of an imperfect agency relation). We also argue 
that going public may impact each of these dimensions in distinct ways (what we 
designate by drivers). Another distinguishing feature of the paper is that, while we 
expect that an IPO is likely to be a more severe event for emerging growth companies 
(EGC) than it is for non-emerging growth companies (NEGC), we decide to 
investigate both. 
We combine data from SDC, USPTO’s TAF and Kenney and Patton (2013) databases 
and take an exploratory empirical approach that encompasses comparing companies 
that applied for an IPO and completed with those that withdrew9, to assess the impact 
of going public on EGC and NEGC. Because we find it likely that the percentage of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Following Bernstein (2015). 
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shares offered at the IPO captures a different set of drivers, we also assess the impact 
of percentage of shares offered at the IPO on EGC. 
We find that, contrary to EGC, going public does not affect the risk-reward 
characteristics of NEGC. Moreover, for EGC: going public affects positively the risk-
reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio; and, the percentage of shares 
offered at the IPO impacts negatively the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation 
portfolio. 
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LITERATURE 
The impact of going public on the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation 
portfolio is fairly hard to predict in general. We claim that the risk-reward of the 
innovation portfolio reflects companies’ investment decisions, and that these depend 
on: companies’ financial constraints; and, investment preferences of their owners and 
possibly their managers (in the case of an imperfect agency relation). As described 
below and summarized in Table 1, going public may impact these dimensions in 
distinct ways. 
As argued above, because the fundamental differences between innovation and other 
more conventional investments are the base for the development of empirical 
predictions, we assume that these fundamental differences also exist between 
innovative activities to develop predictions for both the level of innovation efforts and 
the type of innovation efforts. 
 
Changes in financial constraints 
Going public is an equity financing decision that relaxes companies’ financial 
constraints. Besides the obvious immediate financial slack through IPO net 
proceeds10, there is also a long-term effect11: it improves assess to equity financing 
[Bernstein (2015)]12. It has been suggested that the access to stock market financing is 
particularly relevant for innovative activities (as opposed to more conventional 
investments) because equity (as opposed to debt) is a more suitable source of funds 
[Carpenter and Petersen (2002); Hall (2002); Brown et al. (2009); Hall (2010); Hall 
and Lerner (2010); and, Brown et al. (2013)]. The fundamental differences between 
innovative and more conventional investments justify this prediction. Namely, 
comparatively to other investments, R&D and innovative activities: are less tangible 
and thus lack of collateral (often needed in debt contracts); are harder to communicate 
to outsiders; have more skewed and uncertain returns, which does not fit a contract in 
which only downside returns are shared (often the case in debt contracts); and, have 
longer-term returns. As such, by easing access to equity financing, going public is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 There are non-negligible direct costs of going public such as: underwriting commissions; legal, printing and auditing expenses; 
etc. Using a sample of U.S. IPO between 1972 and 1982, Ritter (1987) estimates direct costs of $250 thousand plus 7% of gross 
proceeds. 
11 We focus on long-term effect. 
12 Moreover, and even though it is not a central argument in our analysis, it is worth noting the following. Since going public also 
requires higher information disclosure to outsiders, arm’s-length debt (for example, bonds) may become relatively more 
attractive, which may in turn ease access to bank debt [Rajan (1992)]. 
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expected to foster overall innovation efforts (which is expected to impact the overall 
reward of innovation) and/or a high-risk innovation portfolio. Hence, going public 
may ease access to equity financing, which in turn may increase the overall reward of 
innovation and/or the risk-reward embedded in the innovation portfolio. 
There is an opposing argument, though. First, while relative to debt financing, equity 
financing is preferable to finance R&D and innovative activities, internal financing13 
is also quite appropriate [Carpenter and Petersen (2002); Hall (2002); Brown et al. 
(2009); Hall (2010); Hall and Lerner (2010); and, Brown et al. (2013)]. This is 
because R&D and innovative activities are associated with higher levels of 
information asymmetry between insiders (management) and outsiders (owners and 
creditors). Second, it has been found that, comparatively to private companies, public 
companies pay higher dividends and adopt a smoother dividend policy [Michaely and 
Roberts (2012)]. Accordingly, by favouring dividend policy in the use of internal 
finance, going public may decrease the overall reward of innovation and/or the risk-
reward embedded in the innovation portfolio. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Changes in investment preferences 
The risk-reward characteristics embedded in the innovation portfolio are also 
sensitive to changes in investment preferences. Going public is likely associated with 
changes of this nature because it implies significant changes in the ownership-control 
characteristics of the firm14. In particular, going public is simultaneously associated 
with ownership dilution, enhancement of diversification possibilities, rise of short-
term earnings pressure and rise of the agency tensions. These are expected to impact 
owners’ preferences and managers’ preferences as follows. 
Owners’ preferences 
Going public impacts the ownership structure of companies. The fact that companies 
get listed in an organized exchange improves the liquidity of its equity and fosters its 
visibility [Pagano et al. (1998)]. It is likely for post-IPO ownership structure to be 
relatively more diluted. At the same time, it is also likely that, comparatively to pre-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Internally generated cash flows.  
14 The literature that addresses the relationship between ownership-control characteristics and innovation is extensive, mainly 
empirical based, and traditionally uses theoretical insights from agency theory [Jensen and Meckling (1976)] and upper-echelons 
perspective [Hambrick and Mason, 1984].  
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IPO owners, post-IPO owners have a smaller fraction of their total wealth invested in 
the company15. Accordingly, pre-IPO owners are expected to avoid more the 
idiosyncratic risk because they are not able to diversify their investment portfolio as 
much as post-IPO owners. Moreover, after the lock-up period16 the pre-IPO owners 
(in particular, managers and founders) can sell their equity stake, which will further 
enhance the diversification possibilities because: it enhances diversification 
possibilities of pre-IPO owners [Pagano et al. (1998)]; and, it is likely that post-lock-
up period new owners have higher diversification possibilities that the pre-IPO 
owners. As such, by allowing higher levels of risk diversification for owners, going 
public is expected to increase the overall reward of innovation and/or the risk-reward 
embedded in the innovation portfolio.  
Again, existing literature enable predictions in the opposite direction: private (public) 
ownership favours innovative (conventional) projects. The reasoning is as follows. On 
the one hand, owners of private companies can profit by adopting an exit strategy 
after receiving bad news, making them relatively tolerant to early failure; and, on the 
other hand, because market prices of public stocks quickly incorporate new 
information, owners of public companies have relatively more incentives to favour 
investments with higher short-term earnings (conventional projects) [Ferreira et al. 
(2014)]17. As such, by lowering owners’ tolerance for failure and increasing their 
focus on short-termism, going public is expected to decrease the overall reward of 
innovation and/or the risk-reward embedded in the innovation portfolio. 
Managers’ preferences 
There are two reasons for taking into account managers’ preferences. First, an IPO 
boosts the conflicts of interest between those who take corporate investment decisions 
(managers) and those who bear the risk embedded in those decisions (owners) [Jensen 
(1989)]. It also implies an immediate decrease in managers’ equity claims, which 
lowers its incentives to focus on innovative and risky activities because they are 
harder to manage [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]18. Second, since after the lock-up 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The portfolio theory argues the optimality of diversification [Fama (1980)]. Others link IPO to diversification [Zingales 
(1995); Black and Gilson (1998); Pagano et al. (1998); Certo et al. (2001); and, Certo et al. (2009)]. 
16 The lock-up period is usually a 4 to 6 month window starting on IPO date in which the pre-IPO owners cannot sell their shares. 
17 Private companies differ from public companies in many ways. The essential difference for this argument is private companies 
are not required to publicly disclose information. 
18 ‘on-the-job’ utility argument. 
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period the manager can sell its equity stake, its incentives to focus on innovative and 
risky activities further decrease19. 
As such, by lowering managers’ incentives for engaging on innovative and risky 
activities, going public is expected to decrease the overall reward of innovation and/or 
the risk-reward embedded in the innovation portfolio. 
 
EGC versus NEGC 
NEGC engaged in an IPO are typically divisions or subsidiaries of large diversified 
public companies [Draho (2004)]. Since the subsidiaries might get some benefit – for 
example, indirectly accessing public equity market – and also bear some of the costs 
of being public – for example, share the costs associated with disclosure requirements 
of the parent company – [Pagano et al. (1998)], we expect that an IPO will impact 
each of the drivers in a more significant way in the case of EGC, relative to NEGC. 
 
IPO versus percentage of shares 
Going public imply changes on financial constraints and on investment preferences. 
Yet, some of these changes are associated with the change in companies’ type of 
ownership – public versus private – while others are associated with the extent to 
which companies are public (or private) – the percentage of shares offered at the IPO. 
For example, if a company completes and IPO, it is expected to comply with a set of 
disclosure requirements, independently on the percentage of shares offered at the IPO. 
Because “access to equity” and “tolerance-for-failure” are mostly impacted by 
changes in information asymmetry, we expect these drivers to be mostly insensitive to 
the percentage of shares offered at the IPO. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 ‘on-the-job’ utility argument, again. 
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EMPIRICS 
We argue that investment decisions depend on financial constraints and on (owners 
and managers) investment preferences, and that an IPO can affect (directly or 
indirectly) all. This results in a set of empirical predictions that point in opposing 
directions, making it hard to predict the impact of going public on the risk-reward 
characteristics of the innovation portfolio. We take an exploratory empirical 
approach. 
 
Empirical strategy 
Our exploratory empirical approach focuses on U.S. companies and encompasses 2 
main blocks of exercises enabled by combining data from SDC, USPTO’s TAF and 
Kenney and Patton (2013) databases. We provide evidence on the impact of going 
public for EGC and NEGC, and on the impact of percentage of shares offered at the 
IPO for EGC.  
IPO 
To capture the effect of going public, we compare companies that applied and 
completed an IPO with those that applied but withdrew the IPO application20. We 
start by analysing the within-company changes in a set of innovation variables around 
the IPO event, for companies that completed an IPO and for companies that applied 
but withdrew the IPO, separately. For each subset of companies, the following form is 
estimated through OLS, for each dependent variable Y. 
 
! ! ! ! !! !!"#$!!!!! ! !!! ! ! 
 
Yeark is a dummy variable indicating the distance in years relative to the IPO year 
(k=0 indicates the IPO year and is omitted). X is a vector of controls that include 
individual effects and time effects. 
In an alternative approach, we try the following specification. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Companies apply for an IPO by submitting an initial registration statement to the Security Exchange Commission, 
demonstrating an intention to go public. Yet, the decision to actually go public is differed in time. Companies have an option to 
withdraw (cancel or postpone) the IPO filling during the book-building phase that follows the filling. 
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Ybefore and Yafter are innovation variables measured before and after the IPO, 
respectively, as defined on data section. IPO is a dummy variable that equals to 1 
when the firm completed the IPO and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of controls that 
include industry effects and time effects.  
Further insights on the impacts of going public on the risk-reward characteristics of 
the innovation portfolio can be obtained by dividing the sample into EGC and NEGC, 
for which we follow Kenney and Patton (2013) definition by considering as EGC 
those that were originated as new and independent, and remain independent till the 
IPO date21. We think this is an informative exercise because, as argued by Draho 
(2004), corporate restructuring of larger firms frequently involves an IPO. As argued 
above, we expect that the drivers identified on literature section to be especially 
relevant in the case of EGC. 
This constitutes an appealing setup because it enables comparison of companies that 
completed an IPO (either EGC or NEGC) with companies that applied and withdrew 
the IPO (either EGC or NEGC). That is, it enables comparison between a treatment 
group (those that completed) and a control group (those that withdrew), where both 
groups are expected to be similar enough because they are in the same stage of the 
life-cycle (they both apply for an IPO)22.  
Percentage of shares 
To capture the effect of percentage of shares offered at the IPO, we try the following 
specification, for each innovation variable Y. 
 !!"#$% ! ! ! !!!!"#$%" ! !! !!!"#$ ! !!! ! ! 
 
Ybefore and Yafter are innovation variables measured before and after the IPO, 
respectively, as defined on data section. Shares is the percentage of shares that go 
public at the IPO date, as defined on data section. X is a vector of controls that include 
industry effects and time effects. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Ideally, we would need an identifier for EGC. However, this data is not available. We try to overcome this using a standard 
imputation procedure. We explain this in more detail on data section. 
22 The evidence on the validity of the control group is provided below. 
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As argued above, we provide evidence on the impact of percentage of shares offered 
at the IPO because we find it likely that the percentage of shares offered at the IPO 
captures a different set of impact drivers. Namely, the percentage of shares offered at 
the IPO is likely related (or considerably more related) with the following drivers: 
dividend policy (change in financial constraints); diversification (change in owners’ 
investment preferences; and, on-job-utility (change managers’ investment 
preferences). Unfortunately, due to data constraints, we are only able to provide 
evidence for EGC. 
 
Data and variables 
We use the SDC database to identify U.S. companies that applied and completed the 
IPO and U.S. companies that applied and cancelled or postponed (withdrew) the IPO, 
in the U.S. market. We use the USPTO’s TAF database to define and characterize the 
patent portfolios of these firms23. Then, we combine these with Kenney and Patton 
(2013) database on emerging growth IPO to split the data into EGC and NEGC24 and 
to collect data on the percentage of shares offered at the IPO, for EGC. 
We start by selecting all IPO with issue dates between January 01 1985 and 
December 31 1993 – 5284 observations, of which 4462 completed while 882 
withdrew the filing. As there are multiple observations per company25, we keep the 
oldest and find a total of 4800 observations. From these, 4038 filings were actually 
completed, while the remaining 762 withdrew the filing. We start in 1985 because this 
is the year from which the SDC systematically covers withdraws. We end in 1993 to 
avoid truncation on the patent data. 
We then use the fuzzy lookup algorithm to match the ‘issuer’ variable from SDC with 
the ‘standard_name’ variable from the NBER. We drive the algorithm twice and keep 
those companies that have the same match with 0.95 or higher on the similarity 
index26. We get a total of 1042 matched companies – 915 completed and 127 
withdrew27. For these companies we identify the 65003 utility patents in the USPTO’s 
TAF database, granted from 1976 to 2006. From these, 1723428 were granted between 
(and including) four years before the IPO and 7 years after the IPO. We define these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Hall et al. (2001). 
24 Through a standard imputation procedure, explained in detail below. 
25 Variable ‘standard_name’ of SDC. 
26 We also exclude those cases for which different issuers have the same match at NBER. 
27 The list of companies is available upon request. 
28 1 out of the 17234 patents is owned by 2 eligible companies, so, in fact there are 17233 different patents in the dataset. 
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as being the eligible patents for the analysis. Restricting the analysis to companies 
that had at least one eligible patent implies loosing 162 firms. Hence, out of the 1042 
firms, we keep 880 (777 completed and 103 withdrew). 
For each of the 17234 eligible patents, we identify all citations received – 338168 
citations. In order to avoid truncation, we use the following citation inclusion criteria. 
We only consider the citations that happened on the first 6 years of each patent life (-1 
years < cited-citing lag29 < 7 years)30. Out of the 17234 eligible patents, 1543331 
patents have at least one eligible citation, while others do not32. We end up with 
153947 eligible citations33. Table 2 briefly describes what results from this process. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Year-by-year innovation variables 
We define the patent portfolio of company i at time k as all patents granted to 
company i between (and including) k-4 and k. We set the IPO year as k=0, and define 
the patent portfolio of each company i for k=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. That is, for every 
company i and every time k, we define the set of eligible patents to be included in the 
patent portfolio of company i at time k as all patents granted to company i between 
(and including) k-4 and k. 
For each time k and company i, we analyse the following innovation variables. (1) 
Patents – number of eligible patents; (2) Cites – number of eligible citations of 
eligible patents; (3) Average Cites – number of eligible citations divided by number of 
eligible patent; (4) Dispersion Cites – standard deviation of the eligible citations per 
eligible patent; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites – average cited-citing lag of eligible 
patents. For eligible patents with eligible citations, this average is computed. Eligible 
patents with no eligible citations are assumed to have a mean lag of forward cites of 7 
years – which is larger than the maximum value that this variable can take for eligible 
patents with eligible citations (6 years). The outcome is computed at the portfolio 
level, as a simple average over eligible patents; (6) Dispersion Lag Forward Cites – 
standard deviation of the cited-citing lag of eligible patents; and, (7) Old – average k-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 cited-citing lag is defined as the difference between the grant year of the citing patent and the grant year of the cited patent. 
30 This is why we confine the IPO dates to 1993. For these IPOs we need eligible patents till 2000 for which we need 7 years of 
observations of citations (till 2006). And citation data is only available till 2006. 
31 More precisely, 15432, as the patent that is shared by two companies has at least one eligible citation. 
32 We considered these 1801 patents to have no eligible citation. 703 were not cited at all, till 2006; 1098 were cited but don’t 
fulfil the citation inclusion criteria. 
33 More precisely, 153944 as the patent shared by the two companies has 3 eligible citations. 
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cited lag34 of eligible citations of eligible patents. Table 3 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent variables for all 880 companies in our sample. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
We are aware that using patent information to measure innovation is sensitive to 
changes in patenting strategy. Yet, (1) Patents is a widely used measure of overall 
innovation return. However, it is also widely recognized that patents may have 
distinct importance/quality. (2) Cites is typically used as a measure of innovation 
return that overcomes this difficulty35. (3) Average Cites and (4) Dispersion Cites 
enable a deeper insight of the project distribution of returns in the patent portfolio. (3) 
Average Cites captures the average return of the innovation portfolio and (4) 
Dispersion Cites capture the extent to which returns embedded on the patent portfolio 
are concentrated around the mean. (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites and (6) Dispersion 
Lag Forward Cites enable a deeper insight of the time distribution of returns in the 
patent portfolio. (7) Old investigate whether the returns embedded on the patent 
portfolio come from recently granted patents or not. 
Key innovation variables 
We focus on the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio, which depend 
on the type of innovation efforts. As argued before we consider an innovation 
portfolio with higher risk as one with higher level of innovation efforts on less 
conservative projects within the innovation portfolio – namely, an innovation 
portfolio with relatively more projects that are harder to manage and communicate to 
outsiders, less tangible and have more uncertain and long-term returns. So, riskier 
projects are expected to be associated with more uncertain and longer-term returns. In 
the former, we should empirically observe a higher dispersion of returns – captured 
by (4) Dispersion Cites. In the later, we should empirically observe a higher (5) Mean 
Lag Forward Cites. As argued before, we expect the reward characteristics of the 
innovation portfolio, to be associated with the risk of the innovation portfolio. We 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 k-cited lag is defined as the difference between the grant year of the cited patent and k. As such, this will take values between 
(and including) 0 and -4. 
35 We are aware that alternative measures for patent quality exist – namely, the number of claims could be used instead of 
forward cites. 
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think that (3) Average Cites captures this particularly well because it is insensitive to 
changes in the level of innovation efforts36.  
Before-and-after innovation variables 
Ybefore and Yafter are innovation variables measured before and after the IPO, 
respectively. We define those as the average value of the innovation variables when 
k=0,1,2 and 3 and k=4,5,6 and 7, respectively. We deliberately consider post-IPO 
years for defining Ybefore to account for the typical lag between investment decisions 
and patenting decisions. In general, results are robust to changes in the before-after 
threshold. 
Table 4 compares the means of each innovation variable, measured at the pre-IPO 
(Ybefore). It is interesting to note that companies that complete an IPO present higher 
overall return of the innovation portfolio – measured by (2) – and an innovation 
portfolio with higher risk – measured by (4). Because our Pre-IPO variables (Ybefore) 
include citations that happen after the IPO event, we may attribute these differences to 
an increase in patent visibility attributed to the IPO itself. As such, while some 
differences exist among the observables related with innovation outcomes, we 
interpret these results as evidence of validity of the control group. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Imputation procedure 
As argued before, ideally, we would need an identifier for EGC because the motives 
to and impacts of going public of an independent company likely differ from those of 
a subsidiary of a public company. Unfortunately this data is not available. We try to 
overcome this with the following imputation procedure, which results are described 
on Table 5.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
We match our previous SDC-USPTO’s TAF combination (880 companies) with 
Kenney and Patton (2013) database. This database encompasses all (and only) 
emerging growth IPO on American stock exchanges that were filed with the SEC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 As opposed to (2) Cites, which captures particularly well the overall reward of innovation. 
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from January 1990 through December 2010. As such, we are only able to match IPO 
fillings that happened between (and including) 1990 and 1993, that were EGC and 
that completed an IPO. We matched names using the fuzzy lookup algorithm and 
keep the cases with 0.95 or higher on the similarity index and we find a total of 277 
matches37. We rely on the precision of this procedure to distinct EGC and NEGC (for 
companies that complete an IPO between 1990 and 1993). The imputation procedure 
further uses all seven pre-IPO innovation variables of interest (Ybefore) to predict an 
EGC status (for companies that applied for an IPO between 1985 and 1993)38. This 
procedure leads to 362 EGC and 315 NEGC39.  
Percentage of shares 
Kenney and Patton (2013) database provides data on the number of shares offered and 
the number of shares outstanding at the IPO date. We then define our independent 
variable of interest Shares as the ratio between both – the percentage of shares offered 
at the IPO. The histogram is presented on Figure 1. It reveals that the percentage of 
shares involved at an EGC IPO is variable, though typically below 50%. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Results 
IPO 
For firms that completed the IPO, results reported on Panel A of Table 6 capture a 
positive trend on (4) Dispersion Cites, and no trend on remaining 2 key innovation 
variables – (3) Average Cites and (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites. The results for 
companies that withdrew the IPO, reported on Panel B of Table 6, are of lower global 
significance. Moreover, taken together with results provided on Table 4, we find no 
evidence of a mean reversion mechanism. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 In this case, this turned out to be quite effective because they also rely on SDC. 
38 We are aware of the limitations of such procedure and find that this would be, perhaps, the first effort to be taken by future 
research. 
39 This implies that the procedure does not predict an ECG status for 203 companies. 
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Table 7 presents the effect of completing an IPO on each innovation variable. Results 
suggest that the risk-reward characteristics of the innovation portfolio are not 
significantly impacted40,41. 
 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
Table 8 presents the effect of going public for the 677 companies (Panel A), for EGC 
(Panel B) and NEGC (Panel C). Results of Panel A are relatively similar to those of 
Table 7. Yet, the separate analysis between EGC and NEGC reveal quite distinct 
results. The risk-reward characteristics of NEGC are not impacted, suggesting no 
change on the type of innovation efforts. Yet, The risk-reward characteristics of EGC 
are significantly impacted. Results for EGC are statistically significant only for the 
project distribution of returns – (3) Average Cites and (4) Dispersion Cites – 
suggesting that the change on the type of innovation efforts is towards projects with 
more uncertain returns. The difference in results sustain our idea that the drivers 
identified on literature section to be especially relevant in the case of EGC. Moreover, 
taken together with results provided on Table 5 (Panels D and E), we find no evidence 
of a mean reversion mechanism42. 
 
[Table 8 around here] 
 
Percentage of Shares 
Table 9 presents the effect of shares offered on each innovation variable. The 
percentage of shares offered at the IPO impacts negatively the risk-reward 
characteristics of the innovation portfolio. Again, only the project distribution of 
returns is affected43. If the percentage of shares captures only the drivers “dividend 
policy”, “diversification” and “on-the-job utility”44, these results suggest that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Except a slightly significant lower (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites. 
41 As a robustness check, Table 11 on Appendix B is similar to Table 7, except for the definition Ybefore and Yafter. In this case, 
Ybefore and Yafter are defined as the average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1 and 2 and k=3,4,5,6 and 7, respectively. 
In general, the direction of impacts is the same and statistical significance varies slightly. 
42 As a robustness check, Table 12 on Appendix B is analogous to panels B and C of Table 8, except that it is a Difference-in-
Differences approach. In general, the direction of impacts is the same and statistical significance drops significantly for key 
dependent variables. 
43 As a robustness check: we discretised Shares and obtained analogous results; we also tried a different definition for Ybefore and 
Yafter – defined as the average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1 and 2 and k=3,4,5,6 and 7, respectively, and obtained 
similar results. These are available upon request. 
44 Our claim here is that we expect that the remaining drivers (“access to equity” and tolerance-for-failure and short-term 
pressure”) to be particularly relevant when the company becomes public, but likely insensitive to Shares. 
! 18!
driver “diversification” is dominated by the drivers “dividend policy” and/or “on-the-
job utility”.  
Comparing these results with those of Panel B of Table 8 is further informative. If we 
assume that the average impact of going public that is jointly attributable to the 
drivers captured by the percentage of shares (“dividend policy”, “diversification” and 
“on-the-job utility”) is also negative, it follows that the drivers “access to equity” 
dominates the impact of “tolerance-for-failure and short-term pressure”. 
 
[Table 9 around here] 
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DISCUSSION 
We argue that going public may impact the risk-reward characteristics of the 
innovation portfolio because it potentially impacts companies’ financial constraints, 
and investment preferences of their owners and possibly their managers, each of 
which driving (possibly opposing) impacts on the type of innovation efforts. 
Combining data from SDC, USPTO’s TAF and Kenney and Patton (2013) databases 
and focusing on U.S. companies, take an exploratory approach that encompasses 
assessing the impact of going public by EGC and NEGC and assessing the impact of 
shares offered by EGC at the IPO. Our main findings are the following. 
First, results on time distribution of results – in which we include one dimension of 
innovation portfolio risk, (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites – are generally fuzzy and 
mostly non-significant. This suggests that the impact of going public is not clearly 
towards a more explorative portfolio nor it is to a more exploitative portfolio. Or 
alternative, we don’t see a significant impact on the time dimension variable that 
typical is incorporated in the definition of explorative versus exploitative research – 
(5) Mean Lag Forward Cites. This is a particularly interesting result when set in 
parallel with evidence from Wu (2012). 
Second, contrary to NEGC, results in project distribution of results – in which we 
include another dimension of innovation portfolio risk, (4) Dispersion Cites, and the 
innovation portfolio reward, (3) Average Cites – are strongly significant for EGC, in 
both IPO specification and Shares specification. Suggesting that this dimension of 
risk, in specific, is highly correlated with reward.  
However, results for EGC are mostly contrary, depending on whether we consider the 
IPO specification (positive impact on reward and risk embedded in the innovation 
portfolio) or the Shares specification (negative impact on reward and risk embedded 
in the innovation portfolio). We argue the alternative specifications capture a different 
set of empirical predictions (drivers). If, as we advanced, the percentage of shares 
captures only the drivers “dividend policy”, “diversification” and “on-the-job utility”, 
these results suggest that the positive driver “diversification” is dominated by the 
negative drivers “dividend policy” and/or “on-the-job utility”. If we further assume 
that the average impact of going public that is jointly attributable to these 3 drivers is 
also negative, it follows that the drivers “access to equity” dominates the impact of 
“tolerance-for-failure and short-term pressure”.  
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Yet, think that the advanced predictions are not exhaustive though. There may well 
exist alternative drivers in play. For example, going public may also be associated 
with inventors’ mobility [Wu (2012); and, Bernstein (2015)], impacting companies’ 
capabilities. This can be a consequence of the drivers just exposed (a shift in 
inventors’ job-market demand), but it also can be a parallel direct consequence of IPO 
event, if inventors’ have a relative preference for a particular stage of companies’ life-
cycle (a shift in inventors’ job-market supply). We think that further research is 
needed to investigate the impacts on inventors’ job-market.  
We are aware that results are limited, in the sense that we are not able to provide a full 
explanation for the evidence on the risk-return of the innovation portfolio for ECG, of 
both: positive average impact of IPO; and, negative of shares offered at the IPO. 
However, we think that this reflects the complexity of the IPO event, and of its’ 
impact on innovation. 
There are several limitations worth pointing out. On the one hand, we are concerned 
with measurement-related issues because we do not observe possible changes in 
patenting strategy, and we do not observe patents’ visibility changes (which could 
impact the Average Cites through Cites). We think this is more concerning in our IPO 
specification than it is on our Shares specification because we find it likely that the 
percentage of shares offered at the IPO is unrelated with visibility – potentially being 
more effective on isolating, as a whole, the arguments presented in the theoretical 
framework section. I any case, we don’t think that the measuring issue is driving the 
difference in results found between IPO and Shares specifications. On the other hand, 
one could question the exogeneity of IPO and Shares variables. Finally, we rely on 
the assumption that the decision to withdraw/complete is unrelated to companies’ 
innovation policies or opportunities. This is questionable, because some factors that 
justify the decision to withdraw may also impact the outcome variables. Numerous 
factors justify the decision to withdraw, all of which occurring in the book-building 
phase: “the IPO process itself (for example, the inability to comply with SEC 
disclosure requirements or resolve SEC staff comments, a poor road show, or 
resignation of the enterprise’s underwriters or auditors) […] market conditions (for 
example, reduced market liquidity or demand for IPOs, changes in interest rates and 
costs of capital, or changes in market sector valuations) […] adverse business 
developments (for example, loss of a customer or prospective customer, loss of key 
personnel, or inability to obtain financing) […] unexpected change in the outlook or 
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profile of the industry […] in other cases, an IPO might be withdrawn because a 
financial or strategic buyer acquires the enterprise.” [AICPA (2016)]. Hence, 
selection issues may arise, as for example, an increase in the cost of capital in the 
book-building phase could explain both the IPO withdraw and a lower innovation 
outcome. 
Future research could also investigate the role of corporate governance – in line with 
Hill and Snell (1988), Baysinger et al. (1991) and Francis and Smith (1995) – and 
managers’ characteristics – in line with Barker and Mueller (2002) and Kor (2006) in 
this particular setting. A possible extension would be to assess the impact of corporate 
governance effectiveness, around the IPO event. We would expect that more effective 
corporate governance would favour owners’ characteristics (as opposed to managers’) 
– which, in the case of Shares specification, and according to our predictions, would 
positively foster the risk-reward embedded in the innovation portfolio.  
! 22!
REFERENCES 
Aggarwal, V.; and, Hsu, D. 2014. Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation. Management 
Science 60(4): 867-887. 
 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 2016. Accounting and 
Valuation Guide: valuation of privately-held-company equity securities issued as 
compensation. Wiley.!ISBN: 978-1-937352-22-6. 
 
Barker, V.; and, Mueller, G. 2002. CEO Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending. 
Management Science. 48(6): 782-801. 
 
Baysinger, B.; Kosnik, R.; and, Turk, T. 1991. Effects of Board and Ownership 
Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy. Academy of Management Journal. 34(1): 205-
214. 
 
Bernstein, S. 2015. Does Going Public Affect Innovation? The Journal of Finance. 
70(4): 1365-1403. 
 
Black, B.; and, Gilson, R. 1998. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
banks versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics. 47: 243-277. 
 
Brown, J.; Fazzari, S.; and, Petersen, B. 2009. Financing Innovation and Growth: cash 
flow, external equity, and the 1990s R&D boom. The Journal of Finance. 64(1): 151-
185. 
 
Brown, J.; Martinsson, G.; and, Petersen, B. 2013. Law, Stock Markets, and 
Innovation. The Journal of Finance. 68(4): 1517-1549.  
 
Carpenter, R.; and, Petersen, B. 2002. Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech 
Investment, and New Equity Financing. The Economic Journal. 112(477): 54-72. 
 
! 23!
Certo, S.; Covin, J.; Daily, C.; and, Dalton, D. 2001. Wealth and the Effects of 
Founder Management Among IPO-stage New Ventures. Strategic Management 
Journal. 22(6-7): 641-658. 
 
Certo, S.; Holcomb, T.; and, Holmes, R. 2009. IPO Research in Management and 
Entrepreneurship: Moving the Agenda Forward. Journal of Management. 35(6): 1340-
1378. 
 
Draho, J. 2004. The IPO Decision: why and how companies go public. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Fama, E. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political 
Economy. 88(2): 288–307. 
 
Ferreira, D.; Manso, G.; and, Silva, A. 2014. Incentives to Innovate and the Decision 
to Go Public or Private. The Review of Financial Studies. 27(1): 256-300. 
 
Francis, J.; and, Smith, A. 1995. Agency Costs and Innovation: some empirical 
evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 19: 383-409. 
 
Hambrick, D.; and, Manson, P. 1984. Upper Echelons: the organization as a reflection 
of its top managers. The Academy of Management Review. 9(2): 193-206. 
 
Hall, B. ; Jaffe, A.; and, Trajtenberg, M. 2001. The NBER patent citation data file: 
lessons, insights and methodological tools. NBER Working Paper 8498. 
 
Hall, B. 2002. The Financing of Research and Development. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy. 18(1): 35-51. 
 
Hall, B. 2010. The Financing of Innovative Firms. Review of Economics and 
Institutions. 1(1): 1-30. 
 
! 24!
Hall, B.; and, Lerner J. 2010. The Financing of R&D and Innovation. In Handbook of 
the Economics of Innovation, ed. Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg. 609-639. 
Elsevier. 
 
Hill, C.; and, Snell, S. 1988. External Control, Corporate Strategy, and Firm 
Performance in Research-Intensive Industries. Strategic Management Journal. 9(6): 
577-590. 
 
Jensen, M. 1989 (rev. 1997). Eclipse of the Public Corporation. Harvard Business 
Review.  
 
Jensen, M.; and, Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the Firm: managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 3(4): 305-360. 
 
Kenney, M.; and, Patton, D. 2013. Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) from 1990 through 2010. Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research. 
 
Kor, Y. 2006. Direct and Interaction Effects of Top Management Team and Board 
Compositions on R&D Investment Strategy. Strategic Management Journal. 27(11): 
1081-1099. 
 
March, J. 1991. Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. 
Organization Science. 2(1): 71–87. 
 
Michaely, R.; and, Roberts, M. 2012. Corporate Dividend Policies: lessons from 
private firms. The Review of Financial Studies. 25(3): 711-746. 
 
Pagano, M.; Panetta, F.; and, Zingales, L. 1998. Why do Companies Go Public? An 
empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance. 53(1): 27–64. 
 
Rajan, R. 1992. Insiders and Outsiders: the choice between informed and arm’s-
length debt. The Journal of Finance. 47(4): 1367-1400. 
 
! 25!
Ritter, J. 1987. The Costs of Going Public. Journal of Financial Economics. 19: 269-
281. 
 
Wu, G. 2012. The Effect of Going Public on Innovative Productivity and Exploratory 
Search. Organization Science. 23 (4): 928–950. 
 
Zingales, L. 1995. Insider Ownership and the Decision To Go Public. Review of 
Economic Studies. 62(3): 425-448. 
! 26!
APPENDIX A – main figures and tables
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Table 1 – Synthesis of predictions 
The table synthesises the empirical predictions on the overall reward of innovation and/or on the risk-reward of the innovation portfolio. 
 
 
Scope of impact  Driver Main references Predicted effect on overall reward of innovation and/or on the risk-reward of the innovation portfolio 
Changes in financial constraints  Access to equity Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2013) + 
  Dividend policy Michaely and Roberts (2012) | Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) - 
Changes in investment preferences Owners’ preferences Diversification Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) + 
  Tolerance-for-failure and short-term pressure Ferreira, Manso and Silva (2014) - 
 Managers’ preferences On-the-job utility Jensen and Meckling (1976) - !
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Table 2 – IPO and patent data 
The table presents the sample distribution of IPO, patents and citations over time. 
 
 
 
Year 
 
IPO 
 
Patents 
 
Citations by Grant Year of Cited 
 
 
Citations by Grant Year of Citing 
 
 Completed Withdrew Completed Withdrew Completed Withdrew Completed Withdrew 
1981   2 4 0 12 0 0 
1982   124 4 280 62 2 3 
1983   285 21 782 71 36 4 
1984   367 33 1094 92 120 12 
1985 48 3 352 31 1081 122 266 32 
1986 115 15 313 23 1389 78 428 55 
1987 97 14 518 42 2801 121 685 71 
1988 38 7 644 51 3240 276 990 78 
1989 43 2 860 95 4842 496 1677 124 
1990 45 13 936 98 6160 541 1969 158 
1991 106 2 1078 82 7342 471 2559 222 
1992 116 30 1280 102 10409 724 3404 306 
1993 169 17 1419 86 13335 485 4844 356 
1994   1319 78 14731 508 6099 483 
1995   1081 45 14257 259 7597 422 
1996   1173 57 15998 304 9391 447 
1997   1171 96 14782 598 10192 553 
1998   1548 99 17204 541 15239 557 
1999   1059 63 11539 288 15088 431 
2000   579 16 6546 86 16128 441 
2001       15204 343 
2002       12585 350 
2003       10581 407 
2004       7424 179 
2005       3733 86 
2006       1571 15 
Total 777 103 16108 1126 147812 6135 147812 6135 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the innovation variables for all 880 companies in the sample. Each company has 8 
observations (k=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). For (1) and (2), there are no missing values. For (3) to (7) there are missing values 
because some of the portfolios have zero eligible patents. (7) is further restricted to observations with at least 1 eligible citation.  
 
 
Innovation Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
(1) – Patents 7040 7.692898 28.44974 0 708 
(2) – Cites 7040 67.24361 295.759 0 10812 
(3) – Average Cites 5129 8.274504 9.196147 0 133 
(4) – Dispersion Cites 5129 4.127362 5.973097 0 70.74876 
(5) – Mean Lag Forward Cites 5129 4.310513 0.8595701 1 7 
(6) – Dispersion Lag Forward Cites 5129 0.6637803 0.6123937 0 3 
(7) – Old 4992 -1.656017 1.115773 -4 0 
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Table 4 – Pre-IPO differences between completed and withdrew companies 
The table compares the means of each of the pre-IPO values of innovation variables (Ybefore) between companies that completed 
an IPO and companies that withdrew an IPO. The innovation variables are: (1) Patents; (2) Cites; (3) Average Cites; (4) 
Dispersion Cites; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites; (6) Dispersion Lag Forward Cites; and, (7) Old. It is an independent sample t-
test assuming unequal variances. We restrict the analysis to those companies that have no missing values on both Ybefore and Yafter 
– the average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1,2 and 3 and k=4,5,6 and 7, respectively. Regarding Ybefore and Yafter 
constructs: in (3) and (5) the average is conditional on those observations that have more than zero eligible patents; for the 
dispersion measures (4) and (6) we decided to restrict the average conditional on those observations that have more than one 
eligible patent (to avoid cases in which standard deviation is hard to interpret); in (7) we confined the analysis to those 
observations that have at least one eligible citation. The number of companies is reported in parenthesis. *P<10%*; **P<5%; 
***P<1% (two-tailed p-values). 
 
 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Withdrew 4.01699 (103) 
21.06553 
(103) 
6.738466 
(76) 
3.406136 
(48) 
4.334577 
(76) 
1.004438 
(48) 
-1.267203 
(73) 
Completed 5.759331 (777) 
42.75676 
(777) 
8.26522 
(586) 
5.070864 
(435) 
4.277963 
(586) 
0.8537027 
(435) 
-1.104182 
(575) 
Difference -1.74234 -21.69122*** -1.526754 -1.664729*** 0.0566142 0.150735* -0.1630213 
 
  
! "#!
Table 5 – Pre-IPO differences between groups – imputation 
The table compares the means of each of the pre-IPO innovation variables (Ybefore) between selected groups. The innovation 
variables are: (1) Patents; (2) Cites; (3) Average Cites; (4) Dispersion Cites; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites; (6) Dispersion Lag 
Forward Cites; and, (7) Old. It is an independent sample t-test assuming unequal variances. We restrict the analysis to those 
companies that have no missing values on both Ybefore and Yafter – the average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1,2 and 
3 and k=4,5,6 and 7, respectively. Regarding Ybefore and Yafter constructs: in (3) and (5) the average is conditional on those 
observations that have more than zero eligible patents; for the dispersion measures (4) and (6) we decided to restrict the average 
conditional on those observations that have more than one eligible patent (to avoid cases in which standard deviation is hard to 
interpret); in (7) we confined the analysis to those observations that have at least one eligible citation. The number of companies 
is reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1% (two-tailed p-values). 
 
 
Panel A – emerging growth companies and non-emerging growth companies – Kenney and Patton (2013) criteria – that 
completed an IPO between (and including) 1990 and 1993. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Non-emerging growth 6.580189 (159) 
47.16352 
(159) 
7.322459 
(119) 
4.713641 
(82) 
4.282581 
(119) 
0.9828356 
(82) 
-1.2773539 
(118) 
Emerging growth 5.011733 (277) 
61.27256 
(277) 
11.03087 
(216) 
6.755832 
(171) 
4.296502 
(216) 
0.6869671 
(171) 
-1.113085 
(214) 
Difference 1.568456 -14.10904 -3.708406*** -2.042191*** -0.0139211 0.2958685*** 0.160444* 
 
Panel B – emerging growth companies and non-emerging growth companies – imputation – that applied for an IPO 
between (and including) 1985 and 1993. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Non-emerging growth 8.75 (315) 
50.95714 
(315) 
6.017356 
(262) 
3.809364 
(218) 
4.324198 
(262) 
1.057081 
(218) 
-1.336408 
(259) 
Emerging growth 5.735497 (362) 
52.48204 
(362) 
10.24295 
(308) 
5.829088 
(264) 
4.260335 
(308) 
0.7163934 
(264) 
-1.065732 
(306) 
Difference 3.014503 -1.524901 -4.225594*** -2.019724*** 0.0638631 0.3406975*** -0.2706761*** 
 
Panel C – companies considered and not considered by the imputation procedure. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Not considered 0.2770936 (203) 
1.683498 
(203) 
6.78442 
(92) 
0 
(1) 
4.252072 
(92) 
0 
(1) 
-0.6646586 
(83) 
Considered 7.138109 (677) 
51.77253 
(677) 
8.300659 
(570) 
4.915603 
(482) 
4.28969 
(570) 
0.8704848 
(482) 
-1.189812 
(565) 
Difference -6.861016*** -50.08903*** -1.516239 - -0.0376176 - 0.5251534*** 
 
Panel D – companies that completed and companies that withdrew between (and including) 1985 and 1993 and 
considered emerging growth by the imputation. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Withdrew 6.409091 (22) 
32.17045 
(22) 
6.116851 
(22) 
3.477117 
(21) 
4.337194 
(22) 
0.9633122 
(21) 
-1.332505 
(22) 
Completed 5.691912 (340) 
53.79632 
(340) 
10.56034 
(286) 
6.032345 
(243) 
4.254423 
(286) 
0.6950547 
(243) 
-1.045067 
(284) 
Difference 0.7171791 -21.62587 -4.443491* -2.555228* 0.082771 0.2682575** -0.2874382* 
 
Panel E – companies that completed and companies that withdrew between (and including) 1985 and 1993 and 
considered non-emerging growth by the imputation. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Withdrew 8.844828 (29) 
46.11207 
(29) 
5.415533 
(27) 
3.350928 
(27) 
4.20365 
(27) 
1.036424 
(27) 
-1.723114 
(27) 
Completed 8.740385 (286) 
51.44843 
(286) 
6.086501 
(235) 
3.874169 
(191) 
4.338049 
(235) 
1.060012 
(191) 
-1.291404 
(232) 
Difference 0.104443 -5.336358 -0.670968 -0.5232405 -0.1343985 -0.235883 -0.4317097*** 
! "#!
Figure 1 – Percentage of shares offered by EGC IPO 
The table presents the histogram for the variable Shares of emerging growth companies. Shares is the number of shares offered 
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the IPO date – hence, the percentage of shares that go public at the IPO date.  
IPOs between (and including) 1990 and 1993. 
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Table 6 – Within-company changes around IPO 
The table presents within-company changes in innovation portfolio around the IPO event. The innovation variables are: (1) 
Patents; (2) Cites; (3) Average Cites; (4) Dispersion Cites; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites; (6) Dispersion Lag Forward Cites; and, 
(7) Old. Year are dummy variables indicating the distance in years relative to the IPO year (year0 is a dummy variable indicating 
the IPO year and is omitted). For the dispersion measures – (4) and (6) – we decided to restrict the analysis to those observations 
for which eligible patents are higher than 1. This is because it is hard to interpret the standard deviation for portfolios that have 
zero or 1 single patent. For (7), we confined the analysis to those observations that have at least one eligible citation. All models 
are estimated with individual effects and time effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the company level, are reported in 
parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – companies that completed the IPO. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year1 
0.9419218*** 
(0.2110434) 
11.36039*** 
(3.036001) 
0.30432 
(0.2436527) 
0.1869706 
(0.1979076) 
-0.0356332 
(0.0302327) 
0.0028217 
(0.0272987) 
-0.0720904 
(0.0554371) 
Year2 
1.839024*** 
(0.3877727) 
20.30196*** 
(5.623021) 
0.2243728 
(0.2899147) 
0.4891198* 
(0.2561703) 
-0.0177603 
(0.0447419) 
0.0395291 
(0.0379448) 
-0.2677822*** 
(0.0772906) 
Year3 
2.751789*** 
(0.5413942) 
28.41094*** 
(7.706803) 
0.2823738 
(0.3784376) 
0.5270903* 
(0.3118352) 
0.0037788 
(0.0571334) 
0.0459603 
(0.0478068) 
-0.5182458*** 
(0.0957407) 
Year4 
3.645189*** 
(0.6643438) 
37.4708*** 
(9.129791) 
0.3886569 
(0.414465) 
0.6697476** 
(0.3341235) 
-0.0048901 
(0.0696846) 
0.0522687 
(0.0582759) 
-0.8909923*** 
(0.1086564) 
Year5 
4.646364*** 
(0.7400288) 
51.256*** 
(9.628333) 
0.3384813 
(0.4472251) 
0.9258513** 
(0.3630331) 
-0.0134343 
(0.082007) 
0.0556057 
(0.0670863) 
-1.229551*** 
(0.1189182) 
Year6 
6.09482*** 
(0.8126755) 
67.93346*** 
(10.11565) 
0.2563481 
(0.4719717) 
0.9714929** 
(0.3925792) 
-0.0001672 
(0.0927741) 
0.1033767 
(0.0769662) 
-1.523302*** 
(0.1325815) 
Year7 
7.642803*** 
(0.8871147) 
88.03155*** 
(11.7862) 
0.2377998 
(0.4639487) 
1.279353*** 
(0.3830887) 
-0.0114008 
(0.1022097) 
0.1373309 
(0.0862495) 
-1.823641*** 
(0.1455712) 
Overall R2 0.0090 0.0181 0.0160 0.0343 0.0016 0.0045 0.0546 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0250 0.0000 0.6688 0.0070 0.0000 
Observations 6216 6216 4551 3367 4551 3367 4443 
Clusters 777 777 777 612 777 612 763 
 
Panel B – companies that withdrew the IPO. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year1 
0.6936815* 
(0.3570655) 
3.600747** 
(1.542921) 
-0.1679462 
(0.3842141) 
-0.2433977 
(.3706215) 
-0.1083188 
(0.1104805) 
0.1111133 
(0.086806) 
0.0688153 
(.2505061) 
Year2 
1.188553** 
(0.5535449) 
4.247701 
(2.556391) 
-0.8340949 
(0.5541454) 
-0.5095872 
(.4056793) 
-0.039621 
(0.1508337) 
0.1260473 
(0.0881683) 
-0.2320224 
(.3147209) 
Year3 
1.696358** 
(0.692577) 
7.307061* 
(3.795701) 
-0.630386 
(0.6351442) 
-0.665594 
(.5975086) 
-0.0044839 
(0.1920293) 
0.0256581 
(0.1258628) 
-0.3035067 
(.3956928) 
Year4 
1.916244** 
(0.9574119) 
8.837203 
(5.660899) 
-0.5249066 
(0.7098703) 
-1.105454* 
(.6269939) 
0.1469317 
(0.1969379) 
0.0369521 
(0.1436581) 
-0.7588851* 
(.4516066) 
Year5 
1.619121 
(1.139365) 
7.658726 
(6.829197) 
-0.1938081 
(0.7422564) 
-0.7189939 
(.7436413) 
0.2179866 
(0.1948683) 
0.1134348 
(0.1407505) 
-0.9281189* 
(.494045) 
Year6 
1.154896 
(1.18015) 
7.171304 
(6.874059) 
0.0414306 
(0.7808569) 
-0.3819971 
(.7900586) 
0.3131802* 
(0.1872403) 
0.1162212 
(0.1552514) 
-1.034922* 
(.558678) 
Year7 
1.53589 
(1.182978) 
11.08175 
(6.856124) 
-0.151978 
(0.7331384) 
-0.136813 
(.7875467) 
0.4047379** 
(0.2029859) 
0.1096068 
(0.1760236) 
-1.242043** 
(.6076176) 
Overall R2 0.0075 0.0145 0.0047 0.0530 0.0225 0.0089 0.0407 
Prob>F 0.0320 0.0821 0.6814 0.4387 0.3123 0.0025 0.0000 
Observations 824 824 578 364 578 364 549 
Clusters 103 103 103 69 103 69 97 
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Table 7 – The effect of going public 
The table presents the effect of completing an IPO on each innovation variable. The innovation variables are: (1) Patents; (2) 
Cites; (3) Average Cites; (4) Dispersion Cites; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites; (6) Dispersion Lag Forward Cites; and, (7) Old.  
IPO is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when the company completed the IPO and 0 otherwise. We restrict the analysis to those 
companies that have no missing values on both Ybefore and Yafter – the average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1,2 and 
3 and k=4,5,6 and 7, respectively. Regarding Ybefore and Yafter constructs: in (3) and (5) the average is conditional on those 
observations that have more than zero eligible patents; for the dispersion measures (4) and (6) we decided to restrict the average 
conditional on those observations that have more than one eligible patent (to avoid cases in which standard deviation is hard to 
interpret); in (7) we confined the analysis to those observations that have at least one eligible citation. We included industry 
effects and time effects. Industry effects are 1 digit SIC dummies and time effects are IPO year dummies. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
IPOs between (and including) 1985 and 1993. 
 
 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ybefore 
1.184741*** 
(0.1971084) 
2.137991*** 
(0.2589002) 
0.6769843*** 
(0.0662234) 
0.763925*** 
(0.0591634) 
0.543162*** 
(0.0460891) 
0.5839384*** 
(0.0358264) 
-0.0299006 
(0.0431537) 
IPO 3.134382*** (1.175529) 
26.50044** 
(10.76371) 
0.5354535 
(0.5620708) 
0.6894623 
(0.4198007) 
-0.1445835* 
(0.0782126) 
0.0514913 
(0.0616211) 
0.1903776* 
(0.1092102) 
Constant -2.290808 (1.998253) 
-6.051064 
(22.14764) 
0.6739 
(0.8146907) 
0.9046653 
(1.361754) 
2.097642*** 
(0.2753247) 
0.3103412** 
(0.1492047) 
-2.240268*** 
(0.3999673) 
R2 0.7652 0.8068 0.6224 0.6399 0.4228 0.4620 0.4228 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 
Observations 880 880 662 483 662 483 648 
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Table 8 – The effect of going public – EGC vs. NEGC 
The table presents the effect of completing an IPO on each innovation variable. The innovation variables are: (1) Patents; (2) 
Cites; (3) Average Cites; (4) Dispersion Cites; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites; (6) Dispersion Lag Forward Cites; and, (7) Old. 
IPO is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when the company completed the IPO and 0 otherwise. We restrict the analysis to those 
companies that have no missing values on both Ybefore and Yafter – the average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1,2 and 
3 and k=4,5,6 and 7, respectively. Regarding Ybefore and Yafter constructs: in (3) and (5) the average is conditional on those 
observations that have more than zero eligible patents; for the dispersion measures (4) and (6) we decided to restrict the average 
conditional on those observations that have more than one eligible patent (to avoid cases in which standard deviation is hard to 
interpret); in (7) we confined the analysis to those observations that have at least one eligible citation. We included industry 
effects and time effects. Industry effects are 1 digit SIC dummies and time effects are IPO year dummies. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
IPOs between (and including) 1985 and 1993. 
 
 
Panel A – all firms. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ybefore 
1.182224*** 
(0.1997103) 
2.14235*** 
(0.2607179) 
0.6349729*** 
(0.0682928) 
0.7638656*** 
(0.0591865) 
0.4561661*** 
(0.0517028) 
0.5796115*** 
(0.0358647) 
-0.0139195 
(0.0435967) 
IPO 4.331687* (2.34937) 
44.46702** 
(18.90238) 
0.9051967 
(0.5984079) 
0.690825 
(0.4199111) 
-0.026022 
(0.0912823) 
0.0529808 
(0.0617902) 
0.199428 
(0.1266881) 
Constant 7.65843 (10.85141) 
-10.26343 
(64.00168) 
0.6790802 
(0.9826475) 
1.487397 
(1.155935) 
2.217275*** 
(0.2692032) 
0.2112065* 
(0.1137845) 
-2.25159*** 
(0.2599032) 
R2 0.7624 0.8077 0.6122 0.6391 0.3018 0.4611 0.0541 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0634 
Observations 677 677 570 482 570 482 565 
 
 
Panel B – emerging growth companies. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ybefore 
1.282103*** 
(0.2660878) 
1.972412*** 
(0.4354881) 
0.5886456*** 
(0.0749539) 
0.740224*** 
(0.0658016) 
0.5324226*** 
(0.0622801) 
0.6297698*** 
(0.0541939) 
0.0713118 
(0.0645914) 
IPO 3.467196 (2.355683) 
35.97809 
(23.0467) 
2.657417*** 
(0.8683433) 
1.815739*** 
(0.5606962) 
-0.069227 
(0.1309316) 
0.0203394 
(0.0810901) 
0.2901295 
(0.1825057) 
Constant -6.705789 (4.768386) 
-95.32949 
(46.66141) 
-1.089324 
(2.591242) 
-1.931741 
(1.338119) 
2.510019*** 
(0.5378878) 
0.1369963 
(0.1448667) 
-2.116738*** 
(0.3391738) 
R2 0.7722 0.6903 0.5851 0.6659 0.4164 0.5076 0.0491 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7883 
Observations 362 362 308 264 308 264 306 
 
 
Panel C – non-emerging growth companies. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ybefore 
1.135197*** 
(0.2694649) 
2.254367*** 
(0.2550358) 
0.7597101*** 
(0.0595037) 
0.8378859*** 
(0.1237133) 
0.4033025*** 
(0.0814413) 
0.5463501*** 
(0.0548714) 
-0.1236435** 
(0.0592363) 
IPO 5.066868 (3.688949) 
60.73981** 
(29.8315) 
-0.2788624 
(0.0595037) 
-0.151073 
(0.6484997) 
0.0321174 
(0.1312559) 
0.0935623 
(0.0946229) 
0.1338358 
(0.1878276) 
Constant -12.32688* (6.32868) 
-310.6078* 
(186.612) 
21.67437*** 
(2.645204) 
0.2999629 
(0.9505093) 
2.473077*** 
(0.3913057) 
0.0269411 
(0.1236539) 
-2.195544*** 
(0.4066457) 
R2 0.7719 0.8996 0.7258 0.5451 0.2354 0.2354 0.1213 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 315 315 262 218 262 218 259 
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Table 9 – The effect of percentage of shares offered by EGC IPO 
The table presents the effect of shares offered on each innovation variable. The innovation variables are: (1) Patents; (2) Cites; 
(3) Average Cites; (4) Dispersion Cites; (5) Mean Lag Forward Cites; (6) Dispersion Lag Forward Cites; and, (7) Old. Shares is 
the number of shares offered divided by the number of shares outstanding at the IPO date – hence, the percentage of shares that 
go public at the IPO date. We restrict the analysis to those companies that have no missing values on both Ybefore and Yafter – the 
average value of the innovation variables when k=0,1,2 and 3 and k=4,5,6 and 7, respectively. Regarding Ybefore and Yafter 
constructs: in (3) and (5) the average is conditional on those observations that have more than zero eligible patents; for the 
dispersion measures (4) and (6) we decided to restrict the average conditional on those observations that have more than one 
eligible patent (to avoid cases in which standard deviation is hard to interpret); in (7) we confined the analysis to those 
observations that have at least one eligible citation. We included industry effects and time effects. Industry effects are 1 digit SIC 
dummies and time effects are IPO year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; 
***P<1%. 
IPOs between (and including) 1990 and 1993. 
 
 
 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ybefore 
2.030545*** 
(0.0826693) 
2.30173*** 
(0.2897348) 
0.6067885*** 
(0.0921178) 
0.733647*** 
(0.0755794) 
0.4828294*** 
(0.0802728) 
0.6075597*** 
(0.0777935) 
0.0111856 
(0.0735631) 
Shares -14.65472** (6.399349) 
-122.9997 
(112.2886) 
-8.787497** 
(3.439304) 
-8.600904*** 
(2.7023) 
0.2206267 
(0.3416232) 
0.1085451 
(0.2331961) 
-1.477064*** 
(0.4741043) 
Constant 4.955831 (4.812494) 
121.0066 
(92.00639) 
10.61993*** 
(3.397128) 
3.559533*** 
(1.233806) 
2.060714*** 
(0.3793858) 
0.2015629 
(0.1427283) 
-1.271942** 
(0.4890888) 
R2 0.8962 0.8655 0.5887 0.6987 0.3649 0.4689 0.0597 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2481 
Observations 277 277 216 171 216 171 214 
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APPENDIX B – secondary figures and tables 
Table 10 – Within-company changes – robustness check 
The Table is similar to Table 6, except that the analysis is confined to those patents that have at least one eligible citation – 
disregarding 1801 patents with no eligible citation and, consequently, 20 companies (14 completed and 6 withdrew). Provided 
that the analysis is confined to this subset of companies and patents, we change the definition of (5) as it turns out to be possible 
to compute a weighted average. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
IPOs between (and including) 1985 and 1993. 
 
 
Panel A – companies that completed the IPO. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year1 
0.938552*** 
(0.1981605) 
11.49696*** 
(3.095407) 
0.2784644 
(0.2492361) 
0.2250239 
(0.2065297) 
-0.00138 
(0.0234833) 
.0177648 
(.0160319) 
-0.0720904 
(0.0554371) 
Year2 
1.804434*** 
(0.374871) 
20.60858*** 
(5.733569) 
0.1504631 
(0.2999371) 
0.546148** 
(0.2646895) 
0.0131249 
(0.0364792) 
.0237472 
(.0217804) 
-0.2677822*** 
(0.0772906) 
Year3 
2.699948*** 
(0.5279115) 
28.82107*** 
(7.859052) 
0.1180485 
(0.395606) 
0.6442583** 
(0.3186645) 
0.0349589 
(0.0488135) 
.0358275 
(.0264707) 
-0.5182458*** 
(0.0957407) 
Year4 
3.580379*** 
(0.6508512) 
38.09371*** 
(9.301747) 
0.1984181 
(0.4378275) 
0.825828** 
(0.3340766) 
0.039132 
(0.0627126) 
.0492754 
(.0325241) 
-0.8909923*** 
(0.1086564) 
Year5 
4.563875*** 
(0.7253003) 
52.14761*** 
(9.806216) 
0.1539459 
(0.4776766) 
1.127021*** 
(0.352666) 
0.041874 
(0.0749968) 
.0501331 
(.0388674) 
-1.229551*** 
(0.1189182) 
Year6 
5.924525*** 
(0.8008607) 
69.16544*** 
(10.2834) 
0.1270953 
(0.5126924) 
1.198043*** 
(0.372529) 
0.0410303 
(0.0855944) 
.0712831 
(.0446968) 
-1.523302*** 
(0.1325815) 
Year7 
7.376082*** 
(0.8682029) 
89.61902*** 
(11.96419) 
0.1370789 
(0.5150055) 
1.537401*** 
(0.3494555) 
0.02237 
(0.0954303) 
.0791138 
(.0499461) 
-1.823641*** 
(0.1455712) 
Overall R2 0.0112 0.0183 0.0177 0.0261 0.0221 0.0049 0.0546 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0381 0.0000 0.0034 0.0147 0.0000 
Observations 6104 6104 4443 3227 4443 4294 4443 
Clusters  
(IPO firms) 763 763 763 595 763 742 763 
 
Panel B – companies that withdrew the IPO. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year1 
0.7180217** 
(0.3103503) 
3.733216** 
(1.643228) 
-0.1461439 
(0.3912316) 
-0.3226089 
(.4406156) 
-0.0651446 
(0.0695401) 
0.0769239* 
(0.0433973) 
0.0688153 
(.2505061) 
Year2 
1.212892** 
(0.485751) 
4.246834 
(2.680655) 
-0.7592538 
(0.5607449) 
-0.6053809 
(0.4486819) 
-0.036819 
(0.112198) 
0.0881527 
(0.0584824) 
-0.2320224 
(.3147209) 
Year3 
1.657313** 
(0.6550879) 
7.510677* 
(3.943507) 
-0.6290596 
(0.6382699) 
-0.7510603 
(0.6472263) 
-0.0064148 
(0.1660578) 
0.020583 
(0.0901879) 
-0.3035067 
(.3956928) 
Year4 
1.78253* 
(0.8981263) 
9.339202 
(5.874014) 
-0.3382725 
(0.7184288) 
-1.244977* 
(0.6600977) 
0.0086387 
(0.193341) 
0.040063 
(0.0972581) 
-0.7588851* 
(.4516066) 
Year5 
1.493395 
(1.07767) 
8.25676 
(7.117061) 
-0.0887942 
(0.727355) 
-0.742032 
(0.7812898) 
0.0776922 
(0.2024902) 
0.0236101 
(0.1028969) 
-0.9281189* 
(.494045) 
Year6 
1.064755 
(1.131306) 
7.904082 
(7.246043) 
0.0993446 
(0.7354271) 
-0.342682 
(0.8377789) 
0.2038126 
(0.1999465) 
0.0370363 
(0.1151528) 
-1.034922* 
(.558678) 
Year7 
1.290064 
(1.119697) 
12.136* 
(7.20832) 
0.0611765 
(0.7006742) 
-0.0270154 
(0.8327477) 
0.2387452 
(0.2163389) 
0.0168088 
(0.1243079) 
-1.242043** 
(.6076176) 
Overall R2 0.0073 0.0141 0.0086 0.0544 0.0348 0.0135 0.0407 
Prob>F 0.0270 0.0786 0.3794 0.1790 0.0815 0.2171 0.0000 
Observations 776 776 549 324 549 515 549 
Clusters  
(withdrew firms) 97 97 97 62 97 91 97 
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Table 11 – The effect of going public – robustness check 
The Table is similar to Table 7, except for the definition Ybefore and Yafter. In this case, Ybefore and Yafter are defined as the average 
value of the innovation variables when k=0,1 and 2 and k=3,4,5,6 and 7, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
IPOs between (and including) 1985 and 1993. 
 
 
 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ybefore 
1.112791*** 
(0.1810505) 
2.131289*** 
(0.3050299) 
0.607898*** 
(0.0660658) 
0.7450908*** 
(0.0699744) 
0.4674154*** 
(0.0469813) 
0.5486075*** 
(0.0405839) 
-0.0558851*** 
(0.0346566) 
IPO 3.153935*** (1.11493) 
28.71303*** 
(10.44681) 
0.9272478* 
(0.5125851) 
0.6692544 
(0.4397908) 
-0.0609697 
(0.0791938) 
0.074994 
(0.065633) 
0.1651411* 
(0.0914544) 
Constant -0,1464931 (2.058992) 
10.71256 
(21.22547) 
3.181605*** 
(1.114661) 
1.350579 
(1.153915) 
2.490249*** 
(0.3525174) 
0.4627669 
(0.3669862) 
-2.247325*** 
(0.4119121) 
R2 0.536 0.7786 0.6053 0.6208 0.3768 0.4503 0.0680 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 
Observations 880 880 598 424 598 424 584 
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Table 12 – The effect of going public – EGC vs. NEGC – Difference-in-Differences 
The table is analogous to panels B and C of Table 8, except that it is a Difference-in-Differences approach. We included industry 
effects and time effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the company level, are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; 
***P<1%. 
 
Panel B – emerging growth companies. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
After 5.159091** (2.143259) 
37.63636** 
(15.8818) 
-0.5465446 
(0.5378977) 
0.1135149 
(0.4216692) 
0.0818059 
(0.1279866) 
0.0426662 
(0.0902691) 
-0.9185876*** 
(0.2562287) 
IPO 3.874404 (3.775849) 
46.37486** 
(22.16538) 
3.777747*** 
(1.089525) 
2.274692*** 
(0.7872055) 
-0.1037456 
(0.1204907) 
-0.2772129* 
(0.1501919) 
0.2516864 
(0.174158) 
IPO.After 2.172527 (2.332186) 
52.64084** 
(21.23351) 
0.3927083 
(0.7134487) 
0.8907788* 
(0.5075366) 
-0.0726405 
(0.1326725) 
0.1153387 
(0.0931454) 
-0.0499488 
(0.2637913) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0843 0.0621 0.1011 0.0850 0.1280 0.0809 0.3124 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 724 724 616 528 616 528 612 
 
 
Panel C – non-emerging growth companies. 
Innovation Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
After -2.017241 (3.001727) 
-13.96552 
(11.84075) 
0.4332913 
(0.7283845) 
0.5019675 
(0.5222906) 
0.1033094 
(0.1526871) 
-0.0950448 
(0.0833559) 
-0.7236505*** 
(0.2377939) 
IPO -0.9815811 (3.673184) 
-2.344077 
(23.72668) 
-0.1327319 
(0.8918031) 
0.0826412 
(0.6068839) 
0.1510857 
(0.159517) 
0.0439891 
(0.1062545) 
0.3971898*** 
(0.1406497) 
IPO.After 5.333675 (3.233856) 
61.78195*** 
(21.62935) 
0.0801267 
(0.7607207) 
0.111175 
(0.5597379) 
-0.0753986 
(0.1611904) 
0.0466631 
(0.0904055) 
-0.2472508 
(0.2503222) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0278 0.0279 0.2816 0.2286 0.0473 0.1181 0.3041 
Prob>F 0.0001 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.4705 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 630 630 524 436 524 436 518 
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ABSTRACT 
The discovery of R-DNA represented an R&D competence-destroying event for 
incumbent pharmaceutical companies. As a response to that, organizational deals – 
namely, strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions – have been extensively used 
as external sources of knowledge. We examine a potential determinant of 
pharmaceuticals’ decision between these two alternatives: the width of applicability 
of the internal knowledge of the biotechnological company. We find compelling 
evidence that it has a positive effect on the likelihood that the pharmaceutical 
company acquires (or merges with) that biotechnological company. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Till the 1980s vertical integrated companies characterized the pharmaceutical 
industry. Yet, the discovery of recombinant DNA (R-DNA) implied a radical 
transformation of the knowledge base of the industry that, in turn, indubitably 
triggered a vertical disintegration and a fragmentation of the R&D layer – with many 
specialized biotechnological firms operating on drug discovery and fuelling the 
pipelines of incumbent pharmaceutical companies operating the downstream layers of 
the industry value chain1. In a way, drug delivery became much more dependent on 
market transactions (as compared to hierarchies). Yet, mergers and acquisitions (MA) 
and strategic alliances (SA) proliferated within the industry [van Beuzekom and 
Arundel (2006); Sytch and Bubenzer (2008); Shibayama et al. (2008)] – both between 
biotechnological companies (horizontal deals) and between these and pharmaceutical 
companies (vertical deals) – being widely used as means to get access to valuable 
biotechnological knowledge, technologies and innovative capabilities [Schweizer 
(2005)]2. Incumbent pharmaceutical companies, in particular, frequently use SA and 
MA with biotechnological companies as alternative external sources of technological 
knowledge [Powell et al. (1996); Venhaverbeke et al. (2002); Hagedoorn and 
Duysters (2002); Hill and Rothaermel (2003); Rothaermel and Deeds (2004); 
Schweizer (2005); Higgins and Rodriguez (2006); Rothaermel and Hess (2007); and, 
Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2017)]. But, what determines their choice between these 
alternatives? 
This context has received a lot of attention from scholars, leading to a rich and rather 
dispersed literature. A few take the perspective of biotechnological and have 
suggested that biotechnological companies have some discretion when choosing 
pharmaceutical allies [Katila et al. (2008); and, Diestre and Rajagopalan (2012)]3. 
Others, as we, take the perspective of the pharmaceutical company and investigate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The value chain of the pharmaceutical industry encompasses the following ordered steps (which are needed to deliver a drug to 
the end-user): R&D; manufacturing; supply and logistics; and, marketing and sales. The R&D step encompasses the following 
ordered sub-steps: drug discovery (gene or genome sequencing; target discovery; target validation; and, lead discovery); pre-
clinical tests (animal studies); and, clinical tests (phase I; phase II; and, phase III). 
2 While we recognize the existence of vertical deals where the object is related with downstream activities (like sales and 
marketing), arguably motivated by biotechnological companies’ lack of capabilities on these areas, we intentionally avoid this 
discussion because it is out of the scope of this paper. 
3 Katila et al. (2008) suggested that biotechnological companies face a critical tension when selecting an incumbent 
pharmaceutical company as an alliance partner, characterized by a trade-off between value creation and value appropriation. 
Building upon this, Diestre and Rajagopalan (2012) find evidence suggesting that new biotechnological companies are less likely 
to select for R&D allies incumbent pharmaceutical companies that have the ability to absorb and exploit their knowledge when 
they perceive that the pharmaceutical company will also have incentives to misappropriate the biotechnological company’s 
knowledge. 
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how they respond to this competence-destroying event. Results suggest that solutions 
involve: attracting human capital [Zucker and Darby (1997)]; establishing strategic 
alliances with biotechnological companies [Rothaermel (2001)]; acquiring 
biotechnological companies [Schweizer (2005); and, Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)]; 
or, a combination of these [Arora and Gambardella (1990); Rothaermel and Hess 
(2007); Hess and Rothaermel (2011); and, Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2017)]4. While 
enriching, this particular literature stream does not address pharmaceuticals’ choices 
between acquiring and allying with biotechnological companies. While SA and MA 
may be seen as alternative mechanisms to access external knowledge, they are, in 
fact, substantially different.  
It is on a broader stream of literature that we find further insights. Previous work 
suggests that MA would be preferred when external sources of innovative capabilities 
relate with the core business, due to the dangers of uncontrolled technological transfer 
(relative more present in SA) [Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002)]. While we agree with 
this argument, in our view, the decision between MA and SA depends, not only on 
commitment requirements, but also on flexibility requirements [Ghemawat and Sol 
(1998); Smit and Trigeorgis (2004); and, Yin and Shanley (2008)]. In particular, we 
expect pharmaceutical companies not to be indifferent to the usage-flexibility of the 
resources of the biotechnological company. We claim that usage-flexibility of 
resources of the biotechnological company should decrease the flexibility 
requirements of organizational form, and thus be associated with MA. Since 
knowledge base is the critical resource in this setting [Arora and Gambardella 
(1990)], we hypothesise that the width of applicability of the internal knowledge of 
the biotechnological company will have a positive effect on the likelihood that the 
pharmaceutical company will acquire (or merge with) that biotechnological company. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Rothaermel (2001) suggests that incumbents that focus their network strategy on exploiting complementary assets (downstream 
alliances) outperform incumbents that focus their network strategy on exploring the new technology (upstream alliances). 
Schweizer (2005) suggests that biotechnological effective integration by pharmaceutical companies (upstream mergers and 
acquisitions) demand to use a versatile post-acquisition integration approach. Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that the 
performance of mergers and acquisitions is correlated with acquirer’s prior access to information of the targets’ R&D activities 
(measured by previous established alliances) and with a superior negotiation position. Our main distinctive feature is that we 
focus on upstream alliances and compare that to upstream mergers and acquisitions. 
Arora and Gambardella (1990) suggest that alternatives are complementary because they target distinct and complementary sets 
of resources. Our main distinctive feature is that we disregard agreements with other entities (such as universities) and include 
strategic alliances with biotechnological companies. We also focus on a slightly more mature stage of the event.  
Rothaermel and Hess (2007) explore the interdependencies between human, firm and network levels of analysis. Hess and 
Rothaermel (2011) assess the degree of complementary between incumbent’s star scientists and strategic alliances (upstream and 
downstream). Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2017) suggest that the effectiveness of incumbent’s use of external knowledge is 
contingent on its internal knowledge characteristics. Our main distinctive feature is that we focus uniquely on incumbent’s use of 
external knowledge. 
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Combining data from SDC, WRDS (North American Compustat data) and USPTO, 
we find results that support the hypothesis. 
We think this is particularly enriching for several reasons. First, it provides additional 
insights on how pharmaceutical companies vertically integrate R&D (vertical 
backward integration strategy) after discovery of R-DNA. Second, it evidences the 
role of flexibility, and in this sense, it adds to a broader literature stream that has been 
addressing the preferences that companies have for external sources of innovative 
competencies [Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002)]. Finally, this enhances our 
understanding of how the biotechnological and pharmaceutical sector is affected by 
the dynamics of innovation [Dosi and Mazzucato (2009)], as well as other industries 
facing disruption [Gottinger et al. (2010)].  
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The importance of external sources of technological knowledge  
The switch from chemical based to biological based research implied that solid 
understanding of molecular actions and pathologies became necessary for drug 
research [Gambardella (1995)]. This represented an R&D competence-destroying 
event for incumbent pharmaceutical companies [Tushman and Anderson (1986); 
Powell et al. (1996); and, Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2017)]. At the same time, it 
opened a vast domain of research venues, leading to a higher division of innovative 
labour [Dosi and Mazzucato (2009)]. The result was a vertical disintegration and a 
fragmentation of the R&D layer [Grabowski and Kyle (2008); and, Dosi and 
Mazzucato (2009)], operated by many specialized biotechnological firms. 
It has been claimed that, in the context of an emerging technological paradigm, 
incumbent companies frequently use SA and MA as alternative external sources of 
technological knowledge [Powell et al. (1996); Venhaverbeke et al. (2002); 
Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002); Hill and Rothaermel (2003); Rothaermel and Deeds 
(2004); Schweizer (2005); Higgins and Rodriguez (2006); Rothaermel and Hess 
(2007); and, Grigoriou and Rothaermel (2017)]. As such, we find it reasonable to 
conjecture that incumbent pharmaceutical companies respond to the competence- 
destroying event by establishing SA and MA with biotechnological companies. We 
study the decision between these two alternatives, in the post-R-DNA period. 
 
The decision between MA and SA  
MA and SA are fundamentally different corporate arrangements. Comparatively to 
MA, a SA is a more flexible – namely, it is more easily reverted – and provides less 
control over joint assets [Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel (2001); and, Yin and Shanley 
(2008)]. Accordingly, it has been claimed that companies base their decision between 
these two alternatives on the balance of flexibility and commitment requirements 
[Ghemawat and Sol (1998); Smit and Trigeorgis (2004); and, Yin and Shanley 
(2008)], where the flexibility leg states that, in uncertain environments, the necessity 
to adapt favours the adoption of waiting and staging strategies; and the commitment 
leg states that, in competitive markets, engaging in irreversible strategic investments 
may be beneficial for a company because it can influence competitors’ decisions in its 
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favour. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conjecture that pharmaceuticals’ decision 
between MA and SA will depend on the flexibility requirements associated to 
biotechnological companies. Regarding this, it has been claimed that usage-flexible 
resources ease the problem of commitment under conditions of uncertainty, by 
enabling companies that control them to try a wider domain of applications as key 
uncertainties are resolved [Ghemawat and Sol (1998)]5. This suggests that, for the 
pharmaceutical company, the decision to acquire or ally with a biotechnological 
company depends on the level of usage-flexibility of resources of the biotechnological 
company6. In particular, usage-flexibility of resources of the biotechnological 
company should decrease the flexibility requirements of organizational form (that is, 
decrease the needs to revert an organizational deal), and thus be associated with MA 
(as opposed to SA). Since knowledge base is the critical resource in this setting 
[Arora and Gambardella (1990)], our main proposal is that the level of usage-
flexibility of the knowledge base of the biotechnological company will have a 
positive effect on the likelihood that the pharmaceutical company will acquire (or 
merge with) that biotechnological company.  
 
Usage-flexible knowledge base 
Providing a precise definition of usage-flexibility of a knowledge base requires a 
definition of knowledge base. We define knowledge base of the biotechnological 
company as its internal knowledge – the knowledge within the boundaries of the 
biotechnological company – as opposed to a broader definition that would also 
include external knowledge – the knowledge within the boundaries of their horizontal 
partners7. Building upon this, and in line with Ghemawat and Sol (1998), we define 
usage-flexibility of a knowledge base as the extent to which internal knowledge 
enable trying a wider domain of applications. As such, we hypothesise the following. 
Hypothesis – the width of applicability of the internal knowledge of the 
biotechnological company will have a positive effect on the likelihood that the 
pharmaceutical company will acquire (or merge with) that biotechnological company. 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Usage-flexible resources should be understood as resources with larger domains of application, when compared to usage-
specific resources, in line with Ghemawat and Sol (1998).  
6 This is consistent with the dynamic capabilities’ proposal that, in high uncertainty environments, companies are likely to pursue 
strategies that favour building and monitoring organizational capabilities that support flexibility [Teece et al. (1997)]. 
7 Horizontal partners are biotechnological companies that recently engaged in an MA or SA with that biotechnological company. 
We provide more precise/empirical definitions below.  
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EMPIRICS 
Data and sample 
We combine data from SDC, WRDS (North American Compustat data) and USPTO.  
We start by using SDC data to identify MA and SA8 established between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies9 (what we consider vertical deals), 
between 198910 and 1998. In order to do so, we first follow Cortright and Mayer 
(2002), to define the pharmaceutical industry by those companies with one of the 
following primary SIC codes: 2833 (medicinal chemicals and botanic products), 2834 
(pharmaceutical preparations), 2835 (in vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances), 2836 
(biological products, except diagnostic substances), 3826 (laboratory analytical 
instruments), 8731 (services-commercial physical and biological research) or 8733 
(non commercial biological research)11. Second, we follow Rothaermel (2001), and 
partition the pharmaceutical industry in two sets: pharma companies as those 
companies having 2834 as primary SIC code; and, biotech companies as those that 
don’t. We identified 1003 vertical deals between (and including) 1989 and 1998 – 288 
of which are MA, while 715 are SA12. Regarding the 288 MA, 18 are mergers, 160 
are acquisitions where the target is the biotech company, and 110 are acquisitions 
where the target is the pharma company. Since the goal is to model the pharma’s 
decision to acquire a biotech, we keep the 18 mergers and the 160 acquisitions where 
the target is the biotech. Contrary to mergers and acquisitions, identifying the focus of 
strategic alliances is not as straightforward. We adopt the following procedure13. We 
classify SA by the nature and existence of joint activities, and drop 203 SA that are 
exclusively focusing on downstream activities (those that have joint manufacturing 
operations and/or joint marketing arrangements but do not have joint R&D), and keep 
the remaining 512 SA14. We end up with 690 vertical deals – 178 MA and 512 SA – !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 We rely on SDC classification of strategic alliances. These include, among other: equity purchase; funding agreement; joint 
manufacturing operations; joint marketing arrangements; joint research and development; joint venture; licensing agreement; 
royalties; and supply agreements.  
9 Hereafter we indistinctively use: ‘pharmaceutical’ and ‘pharma’; and, ‘biotechnological’ and ‘biotech’. 
10 Data on SA is only available for time window 1985-1998. Moreover, the need to construct independent variables forces 
disregarding vertical deals established before 1989. Yet, the time window is comprehended in the knowledge adaptation process 
period (roughly between 1974 and 1998) and avoids the influence of alternative external shocks [Grigoriou and Rothaermel 
(2017)]. 
11 The only exception is 3826, which was not on theirs.  
12 SDC provides up to 8 classifications for each strategic alliance. For these 715 SA we find: 96 equity purchase; 73 funding 
agreement; 142 joint manufacturing operations; 372 joint marketing arrangements; 425 joint research and development; 76 joint 
venture; 316 licensing agreement; 164 royalties; 25 supply agreements; and, 38 other classification.  
13 Similar to the one used by Hess and Rothaermel (2011) to distinguish between upstream and downstream alliances. 
14 208 cases have either type of joint activities (R&D and manufacturing and/or marketing), while 87 cases have neither joint 
activity. 
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established between (and including) 1989 and 1998. This establishes our baseline 
sample (sample A). Table 1 describes the sample generating process from this point 
on, which encompasses the following adjustments to the sample.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
First, we drop 205 vertical deals in which both companies are not identified as parent 
companies. This is to exclude cases where the identified company (say, a biotech) is a 
subsidiary of a parent company operating mainly at a distinct domain (say, a pharma 
company). Second, we drop 51 vertical deals in which pharma companies are 
identified as biotech companies in another vertical deal, and vice-versa. This is to 
focus on cases of more extreme (or less fuzzy) vertical boundaries15. After these 
restrictions we end up with 434 vertical deals – 99 MA and 335 SA – established 
between (and including) 1989 and 1998. Moreover, the probit model forces further 
restrictions on sample size16. First, we drop 224 vertical deals for which the biotech is 
not identified at WRDS (North American Compustat data)17, 18. Finally, we drop 24 
vertical deals for which the biotech has missing values in core controls. We end up 
with 186 vertical deals (31 MA and 155 SA), 188 companies (89 biotech and 99 
pharma), with considerably more U.S. representativeness at the biotech side – 85% 
vs. 52%. This establishes our sample E, which is our focus sample. 
 
Variables and descriptive statistics 
We define 1 independent variable and 3 sets of independent variables: biotech 
knowledge variables; biotech deal variables; and, other biotech and pharma variables. 
We use USPTO data for biotech knowledge variables19. Part of which are our key 
independent variables, while others are biotech knowledge controls. We use SDC data !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 While we rely on primary SIC code variables on both SDC database for mergers and acquisitions and for strategic alliances, 
some of the dropped cases are situations in which these databases deliver different primary SIC codes. Yet, for some cases we 
identify that the same database delivers distinct primary SIC codes, which we expect to be associated with a change in 
companies’ main activities. We decided to drop these cases to make sure we focus on cases of more extreme (or less fuzzy) 
vertical boundaries. 
16 As explained below the dependent variable is binary, and due to that we use a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a 
pharma to acquire a biotech. 
17 Note that we restrict biotech and not pharmaceutical companies because this would severely shrink the sample size. If we 
depart from baseline sample and only constraint to WRDS (North American Compustat data) data availability on core controls 
for both biotech and pharma, we would reach a sample size of 100 deals. As explained below in more detail, controls for 
pharmaceutical companies use only SDC data. 
18 Because Compustat North America covers publicly traded companies in the U.S. and Canada, kept biotech companies are 
publicly-traded, and most of which are North American. 
19 Note the following. To construct knowledge variables we depart from security identifiers provided by SDC, and used NBER 
files that match USPTO to WRDS (North American Compustat data). These files provide a unique company identifier and take 
into account company reorganizations. 
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for biotech deal variables, capturing: upstream horizontal deal activity of the biotech; 
and, vertical deal activity of the biotech. We use SDC and WRDS data for a more 
complete set of core controls: biotech and pharma variables. Table 2 describes each of 
these variables in more detail. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Dependent variable 
We define the dependent variable – (1) Vertical MA – as a dummy variable, equal to 1 
if the established vertical deal between the pharmaceutical company and the 
biotechnological company is a MA, and 0 if it is a SA. 
Key independent variables 
It has been claimed that in industries in which know-how is critical, both internal and 
external knowledge are of major importance [Powell et al. (1996)]. 
Biopharmaceutical industry is definitely not an exception here. Biotechnological 
companies do rely on organizational deals with their peers to complement their 
(internal) knowledge base, and the extent to which they do so most likely depends on 
achievable complementarities. Accordingly, our empirical proposal is to capture the 
width of applicability of the internal knowledge of the biotech as the extent to which 
external knowledge is: technologically distant from internal knowledge; and 
technologically dispersed20,21. That is, an internal knowledge base with wider 
applicability is one that is applicable to technological distant and technological 
dispersed domains. 
We define internal knowledge as the knowledge within the boundaries of the biotech 
company in the year before the (vertical) event year, and external knowledge as the 
knowledge within the boundaries of their horizontal partners22 in the (vertical) event 
year23. We operationalize this using patent data. The amount/size of internal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 We intentionally use organizational deals (SA and MA) to grasp knowledge ‘relation’. We are assuming that two 
biotechnological companies enter into an organizational deal if and only if their knowledge bases are significantly related. We 
consider this a weak assumption because: on the one hand, biotechnology is knowledge-intensive, and as such it is likely that 
organizational deals are knowledge-driven; and, on the other hand, biotechnological companies are highly specialized.  
21 Note that we consider width of applicability to be conceptually related to the specificity of the internal knowledge, and not to 
the level of specialization of the biotech – which we consider to be conceptually related with the diversity of the internal 
knowledge. As explained below, we also control for level of specialization/diversity. 
22 Horizontal partners are biotech companies engaged with the biotech leg of the vertical deal (through an MA or an SA), within 
4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year).  
23 In order to isolate biotech knowledge from possible impacts of the vertical deal (with the pharmaceutical company), we 
disregard assignee identifiers that are newly attributable to the biotech company in the (vertical) event year – as such we use the 
year before the (vertical) event year. 
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knowledge corresponds to the variable Biotech Patents and the amount/size of 
external knowledge corresponds to the variable Partners Patents24,25,26. 
To capture technological distance, we use two measures of technological relatedness 
between external and internal knowledge – variables (6) Dissimilarity27 and (7) 
Complementarity28. We expect the impact of Dissimilarity to be positive and the 
impact of Complementarity to be negative. To capture technological dispersion, we 
use an inverted measure of class-concentration within the external knowledge – 
variable (8) Partners Knowledge Dispersion29. Accordingly, we expect the impact of 
Partners Knowledge Dispersion to be positive. Note that this is missing for cases 
where external knowledge is empty (no granted patents). We overcome this difficulty 
by adopting a dummy variable adjustment30. This entails plugging zero values to 
missing data cases and including a dummy equal to 1 if the horizontal partners of the 
biotech leg of the vertical deal have no granted patens (thus no classes), within 4 
years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year) – variable (9) Partners 
no Patent. 
Biotech knowledge controls 
It is reasonable to admit that pharmaceutical companies may value both internal and 
external knowledge, and that they do so differently. Because both external and 
internal knowledge are controllable31, and given the higher organizational flexibility 
associated to external knowledge, it can be argued that, keeping everything else 
constant, high external knowledge incidence would offer high customization 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 As explained below, these are set as control variables.  
25 The procedure to identify Biotech Patents and Partners Patents assumes that when a company is acquired the patents go to the 
new owner. Because biotech companies engaged in a vertical merger and acquisition are parent companies, if horizontal MA 
motivate a change in the ownership of patents, it is likely that these patents will be mostly captured in Biotech Patents, as 
opposed to Partners Patents. Note that this procedure also implies disregarding patents granted to partners which where, in the 
meanwhile – that is, between the year of the horizontal deal and the (vertical) event year – acquired by another company. 
26 We are careful enough to avoid double counting, mainly because two biotech companies may be engaged in more than one 
deal. Even so, in very few cases assignee identifiers are repeated. In these cases we attribute the patents to the biotech. Moreover, 
we keep possible co-assigned patents. We are aware that this may inflate the variable Partners Patents (if co-assignment between 
partners exists) and the variable Upstream Patents (for that reason and also if co-assignment exists between the biotech and the 
partners). 
27 Technological dissimilarity is defined as equal to one minus the ratio of overlap of patents in the same class (Biotech Patents 
vs. Partners Patents) weighted by the relative importance of common classes for the biotech leg of the vertical deal (Biotech 
Patents). In other words, it is defined as one minus a measure of technological similarity proposed by Makri et al. (2010). Table 
2 provides a more precise definition. 
28 This is similar to the measure of technological complementarity proposed by Makri et al. (2010). It is defined as the ratio of 
overlap of patents in the same subcategory but in different class (Biotech Patents vs. Partners Patents) weighted by the relative 
importance of common subcategories for the biotech leg of the vertical deal (Biotech Patents). Table 2 provides a more precise 
definition. 
29 This is constructed in the logic of a Herfindahl Index, where the shares of classes are computed with the corresponding number 
of patents. 
30 We do so because this approach keeps observations that would otherwise be dropped and because values are not missing at 
random. 
31 Internal knowledge is controllable for the obvious reason that it is within the boundaries of the company. External knowledge 
is controllable by means of redefining the set of horizontal partners. 
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possibilities. We control for this organizational dimension of flexibility by including 
variable (5) Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio.  
Finally, we add 2 knowledge related controls: variable (2) Upstream Patents – 
defined as the sum of variables (3) Biotech Patents and (4) Partners Patents – to 
control for the size of internal and external knowledge; and; variable (10) Biotech 
Classes to control for the diversity of internal knowledge. 
Biotech deal controls 
Because it can be argued that the value generated by a SA or an MA depends on 
companies’ capabilities to engage in those arrangements, which are developed 
through repeated experience [Villalonga and McGahan (2005)]32, we add prior 
biotech-biotech deal variables to control for possible relative preference for a certain 
type of deal (SA or MA). To control for the possibility that the strength of 
engagement of SA influences pharmaceuticals’ decisions, we further differentiate SA 
deals according to 2 criteria: either or not it is a licensing agreement; either or not it is 
an agreement for joint efforts33. While the first captures the scope of engagement 
(narrower set of assets in the case of licensing agreement vs. broader set of assets), the 
later captures the degree of engagement (high in the case of joint efforts vs. low in the 
absence of joint efforts). Furthermore, in line with previous literature [Higgins and 
Rodriguez (2006)], we control for the number of prior SA established with the same 
pharmaceutical and with other pharmaceutical company. 
Other biotech and pharma controls 
For the pharmaceutical and for the biotechnological company we add a dummy 
indicating if the nationality is U.S. and whether or not they share the same nationality. 
We also control for size of the biotechnological company. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for our sample E. It is interesting to note that the 
relative incidence of mergers and acquisitions in the case of upstream horizontal deals 
is similar to the case of our 186 vertical deals, and considerably below 50%. In line 
with this, the mean of Upstream LC SA is higher than the mean of Upstream HC SA. 
Variables Upstream MA and Upstream SA show large ranges, suggesting that biotech 
companies vary significantly on their deal activity with their horizontal partners. 
Moreover, in 58% of the 186 vertical deals, the biotech leg of the vertical deal has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Building upon: Dyer and Singh (1998); Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999); Anand and Khanna (2000); Hayward (2002); and, 
Kale et al. (2002). 
33 Joint efforts can either be: joint R&D and/or joint manufacturing operations and/or joint marketing arrangements. 
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established a SA with another pharma company, and in 8% of the 186 vertical deals, 
the biotech leg of the vertical deal has established a SA with the same pharma 
company. The amount of upstream knowledge also varies significantly by source: 
biotech (internal) vs. partners (external). Two upstream vertical SA illustrate that. In 
one case, the biotech has 0 patents and their partners have 2965; while in the other, 
the biotech has 1919 patents and their partners have 299 patents. Dissimilarity varies 
between 0.18 and 1, while Complementarity varies between 0 and 0.52. Partners 
Knowledge Dispersion varies between 0 and 0.95. Note that results for Partners 
Knowledge Dispersion should be interpreted cautiously as they are affected by the 
imputation procedure (dummy variable adjustment) – for example, the correlation 
between Dissimilarity and Partners Knowledge Dispersion. Finally, Biotech Classes 
shows a range that is larger than expected, taking into consideration the arguments of 
high level of specialization of biotechnological companies. The histogram in Panel A 
of Figure 1 clarifies that this is due to few outliers, further justifying the inclusion of 
this control. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Analysis 
Since the dependent variable is binary, we estimate the likelihood of a pharma to 
acquire a biotech using a probit model, with errors clustered at the pharmaceutical 
company level. 
 
Results 
Table 4 displays the results of alternative probit models. Ideally we would like to 
include biotech industry dummies (SIC) and year dummies (event year) to control for 
industry characteristics and time effects. This forces dropping a significant number of 
observations due to perfect prediction. We propose to overcome this difficulty by 
replacing these dummies with the following dummy variables: a dummy equal to one 
if the event year is in year 1994 or later; and, a dummy variable equal to one if 
boarder SIC code is 2833, 2835 or 2836. Models A1 and A2 try these alternatives for 
a set of controls. Results don’t seem significantly sensitive to this alternative 
! 52!
specification for industry and time control. Hence, we proceed by using these last 
proposed dummies on Models A3 to B2. Model A3 further adds biotech-biotech deal 
level controls to account for possible relative preference for deal type (MA or SA), 
and Model A4 includes biotech knowledge controls and drops observations for which 
the variable Upstream Patents is zero. Models B1 to B2 further include our key 
dependent variables.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
We find support for the hypothesis. First, the coefficients associated to the variable 
Dissimilarity are positive and statistically significant in model B1. Second, in model 
B2, the coefficient associated to the variable Complementarity is negative and 
statistically significant. Third, the coefficients associated to the variable Partners 
Knowledge Dispersion are positive and statistically significant in models B1 and B2. 
Taken together, we interpret these results as compelling evidence that the width of 
applicability of the internal knowledge of the biotechnological company has a positive 
effect on the likelihood that the pharmaceutical company acquires (or merges with) 
that biotechnological company. 
Our confidence is further enhanced by the circumstance that several additional results 
are as expected. First, the coefficients associated to the variable Biotech-to-Upstream 
Patents Ratio are negative in all models B, which is consistent with the arguments 
supporting the existence of a relative preference for organizational-flexible 
knowledge (external knowledge). Second, results for biotech-biotech deal level 
controls reveal that a relative preference for a certain type of deal (MA vs. SA) is in 
play. Finally, the coefficients associated to the variable Own Vertical SA are positive, 
which is consistent with the view that strategic alliances may serve as a prior step to 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Robustness tests 
All these results are robust to replacement of variable Upstream Patents by the 
variable Biotech Patents34 and the replacement of variable Upstream SA by the 
variables Upstream HC SA and Upstream LC SA35. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 These results are reported on Table 5. 
35 These results are reported on Table 6. 
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We also add variables Pharma MA – number of vertical MA established by the 
pharma leg of the vertical deal, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event 
(excluding the event year) – and Pharma SA – number of vertical SA established by 
the pharma leg of the vertical deal, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event 
(excluding the event year) – to control for pharma deal experience36. While results 
suggest that deal experience is also in play for pharma, our main results remain 
mostly unchanged. 
One important limitation of our study is that the inclusion of further pharma 
characteristics would imply a severe drop in sample size. Yet, because it could also be 
argued that pharma characteristics – namely, pharma size and pharma financial 
constraints – could provide alternative explanations for the decision between 
acquiring and merging with a biotech company, we test that by focusing on variables 
Pharma Assets – total assets of the pharma leg of the vertical deal, reported 1 year 
prior to the event year – and Pharma OCF – operating cash flow of the pharma leg of 
the vertical deal, reported 1 year prior to the event year – for different sample 
restrictions37. Results do not suggest that pharma size and pharma financial 
constraints play a significant role. 
Finally, results are also robust if the analysis is confined to those observations for 
which the variable Biotech Classes is below 30 or below 5038.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 These results are reported on Table 7. 
37 These results are reported on Table 8. 
38 These results are available upon request. 
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DISCUSSION 
The discovery of R-DNA represented an R&D competence-destroying event for 
incumbent pharmaceutical companies. As a response to that, pharmaceutical 
companies have been using SA and MA as external sources of technological 
knowledge. In this study we made an effort to examine pharmaceutical’s decision 
between these two alternatives. Recognizing the importance of usage-flexible 
resources of the biotechnological company, we hypothesise that the width of 
applicability of the internal knowledge of the biotechnological company will have a 
positive effect on the likelihood that the pharmaceutical company will acquire (or 
merge with) that biotechnological company. 
Combining data from SDC, WRDS (North American Compustat data) and USPTO, 
we analyse internal and external knowledge of the biotechnological companies that 
are engaged in an organizational deal (MA or SA) with a pharmaceutical company, 
and find that MA is positively associated with: the technological distance between 
external and internal knowledge of the biotechnological company; and, the 
technological dispersion of external knowledge of the biotechnological company. We 
interpret these results as supportive of our hypothesis. 
The main implication of this paper is that it suggests a backward vertical integration 
strategy for pharmaceutical companies: allying with biotechnological companies with 
more specific knowledge, and acquiring biotechnological companies with less 
specific knowledge. This is consistent with the proposition that “the more specific the 
biotech know-how within an acquired biotechnology company, the more autonomy it 
is granted by an acquiring pharmaceutical company, and the sooner it becomes an 
independent centre of excellence within the pharmaceutical company“ [Schweizer 
(2005)]. More generally, this enhances our understanding of how the biotechnological 
and pharmaceutical sector is affected by the dynamics of innovation [Dosi and 
Mazzucato (2009)], as well as other industries facing disruption [Gottinger et al. 
(2010)]. Moreover, by evidencing the role of flexibility, it adds to a broader literature 
stream that has been addressing the preferences that companies have for external 
sources of innovative competencies [Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002)]. 
Our study entails several limitations. First, due to data limitations, we were unable to 
include further pharmaceutical level controls (in particular, the knowledge base of the 
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pharmaceutical company) and further pharma-biotech controls (in particular, the 
complementarity of knowledge bases). This is particularly critical because, from the 
perspective of the pharmaceutical company, both internal and external knowledge are 
potentially relevant. Second, we were unable to control for possible variation in 
commitment requirements, and as such, inference on the role of flexibility is 
conditional on the assumption that requirements for commitment are invariant. Third, 
it is likely that the way we capture knowledge ‘relation’ calls for refinement. If we 
fail to capture knowledge relation with deal relation – that is, if our assumption, that 
biotechnological companies enter into an organizational deal if and only if their 
knowledge bases are significantly related, does not hold – our measures of width of 
applicability of internal knowledge could be capturing alternative elements. For 
example, it could be argued that the variation in the technological distance between 
internal and external knowledge and technological dispersion of external knowledge 
could be associated to variation in risk-taking behaviour instead of variation of width 
of applicability of internal knowledge. While, as claimed before, we consider this 
assumption to be relatively weak – because biotechnological companies are highly 
specialized and biotechnology is knowledge-intensive, and as such it is likely that 
organizational deals are knowledge-driven – alternative empirical strategies exist. For 
example, one could assume that there is a knowledge relation if and only if there is a 
citation and use knowledge flows (forward and backward citations) to capture 
knowledge relation. Fourth, we are aware that the way we distinguish between 
internal from external knowledge is not free of criticism. Alternative ways to 
distinguish are feasible, namely by considering all horizontal MA as part of external 
knowledge. Finally, we share the typical problems of using patent data to measure 
knowledge. However, we don’t think this is too severe here, for a couple of reasons: 
on the one hand, patenting is a standard activity in this industry; and, on the other 
hand, our ‘older’ observations are reasonably after the discovery of R-DNA.  
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APPENDIX A – main figures and tables 
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Table 1 – Sample generating process 
The Table describes the sample generating process. 
 
 
 
 
  
Sample  Sample Description Dropped vertical deals 
Kept vertical 
deals 
(MA/SA) 
Kept pharma 
companies  
Kept biotech 
companies 
Kept 
companies 
Kept US 
pharma 
companies  
Kept US 
biotech 
companies 
A Baseline - 690 (178/512) 286 390 676 170 272 
B Deals for which pharma and biotech companies are eligible in terms of parent vs. non-parent 205 485 (108/377) 214 288 502 121 204 
C Deals for which pharma companies are not identified as biotech companies and vice-versa (between deal) 51 434 (99/335) 203 265 468 111 187 
D Bridge to WRDS (North American Compustat data): pharma unrestricted and biotech restricted to existing bridge 224 210 (38/172) 105 96 201 54 82 
E Deals for which biotech companies have non-missing values in core controls (WRDS) 24 186 (31/155) 99 89 188 51 76 
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Table 2 – Variable definitions 
The Table describes the variables. Event year is the year of the vertical deal (deal established between the pharma and the biotech). Horizontal partners are biotech companies engaged with the biotech leg of the vertical 
deal (through an MA or an SA), within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year). Sample A was used to compute variables 15 and 16. 
 
 Designation Description 
1 Vertical MA Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the established upstream vertical deal is a MA, and 0 if it is a SA. 
2 Upstream Patents Equals [3]+[4]. 
3 Biotech Patents Number of patents granted within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year) that are within the boundaries of the biotech leg of the vertical deal, in the year before the event year. 
4 Partners Patents Number of patents granted within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year) that are within the boundaries of the horizontal partners of the biotech leg of the vertical deal, in the event year.  
5 Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio Equals [3]/[2]. 
6 Dissimilarity 
One minus the ratio of overlap of patents in the same class (Biotech Patents vs. Partners Patents) weighted by the relative importance of common classes for the biotech leg of the vertical deal (Biotech Patents).!In other words, it is defined as 
one minus a measure of similarity proposed by Makri et al. (2010). More specifically, Similarity equals the following, where ‘overlap’ is the sum of eligible Biotech Patents and Partners Patents for the corresponding criterion. 
[overlap all patent classes/Upstream Patents]*[Biotech patents in common classes/Biotech Patents]. 
7 Complementarity 
Ratio of overlap of patents in the same subcategory but in different class (Biotech Patents vs. Partners Patents) weighted by the relative importance of common subcategories for the biotech leg of the vertical deal (Biotech Patents).  
Analogous to a measure of complementarity proposed by Makri et al. (2010). Complementarity equals the following, where ‘overlap’ is the sum of eligible Biotech Patents and Partners Patents for the corresponding criterion. 
[(overlap all patent subcategories-overlap all patent classes)/Upstream Patents]*[Biotech patents in common subcategories/Biotech Patents]. 
8 Partners Knowledge Dispersion Equals to 1 minus the summation of the squared class shares of patents granted, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year), to the horizontal partners of the biotech leg of the vertical deal (Partners Patents). 
9 Partners No Patent  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the horizontal partners of the biotech leg of the vertical deal have no granted patens (thus no classes) within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year). 
10 Biotech Classes Number of classes in which the biotech leg of the vertical deal was granted at least a patent within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year). 
11 Upstream MA Number of upstream horizontal MA established by the biotech leg of the vertical deal with its horizontal peers, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year). 
12 Upstream SA Number of upstream horizontal SA established by the biotech leg of the vertical deal with its horizontal peers, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year). Equals [12]+[13]. 
13 Upstream HC SA Upstream SA characterized by some type of joint efforts and not characterized by a licensing agreement. 
14 Upstream LC SA Upstream SA that are not considered Upstream HC SA.  
15 Other Vertical SA Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the biotech leg of the vertical deal established an SA with a distinct pharma leg, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year), and 0 otherwise. 
16 Own Vertical SA Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the two legs of the vertical deal established an SA with each other, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year), and 0 otherwise 
17 Pharma U.S. Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the nation of the pharma leg of the vertical deal is the U.S., and 0 otherwise. 
18 Biotech U.S.  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the nation of the biotech leg of the vertical deal is the U.S., and 0 otherwise. 
19 Same Nation  Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the legs of the vertical deal have the same assigned nation, and 0 otherwise. 
20 Biotech Assets Total assets of the biotech leg of the vertical deal, reported 1 year prior to the event year.  
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics 
The Table presents descriptive statistics for each variable of interest and controls, based on sample E. Panel A presents basic descriptive statistics. Panel B presents a correlation matrix. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – basic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Designation Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1 Vertical MA 186 0.167 0.374 0 1 
2 Upstream Patents 186 251.8 544.7 0 2965 
3 Biotech Patents 186 49.56 157.9 0 1919 
4 Partners Patents 186 202.2 487.9 0 2965 
5 Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio 125 0.566 0.431 0 1 
6 Dissimilarity 186 0.859 0.257 0.184 1 
7 Complementarity 186 0.055 0.115 0 0.519 
8 Partners Knowledge Dispersion 186 0.275 0.372 0 0.949 
9 Partners No Patent  186 0.575 0.496 0 1 
10 Biotech Classes 186 7.629 14.09 0 102 
11 Upstream MA 186 0.495 0.988 0 5 
12 Upstream SA 186 2.715 4.555 0 19 
13 Upstream HC SA 186 1.199 2.329 0 10 
14 Upstream LC SA 186 1.516 2.385 0 19 
15 Other Vertical SA 186 0.581 0.495 0 1 
16 Own Vertical SA 186 0.081 0.273 0 1 
17 Pharma U.S. 186 0.548 0.499 0 1 
18 Biotech U.S.  186 0.774 0.419 0 1 
19 Same Nation  186 0.468 0.500 0 1 
20 Biotech Assets 186 1458 3518 0.18 23904 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics (cont.) 
The Table presents descriptive statistics for each variable of interest and controls, based on sample E. Panel A presents basic descriptive statistics. Panel B presents a correlation matrix. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel B – correlations 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
2 -0.16**    
 
   
  
         
3 -0.12 0.49***   
 
   
  
         
4 -0.14* 0.96*** 0.22***  
 
   
  
         
5 -0.03 -0.51*** -0.01 -0.56*** 
 
   
  
         
6 0.19** -0.47*** -0.35*** -0.41*** 0.38***    
  
         
7 -0.19** 0.61*** 0.31*** 0.58*** -0.39*** -0.37***   
  
         
8 -0.14* 0.66*** 0.30*** 0.64*** -0.83*** -0.68*** 0.57***  
  
         
9 0.18** -0.53*** -0.32*** -0.48*** 0.77*** 0.64*** -0.56*** -0.86***            
10 0.20*** 0.61*** 0.85*** 0.41*** -0.09 -0.60*** 0.39*** 0.45*** -0.49***           
11 0.01 0.08 0.13* 0.04 -0.09 -0.26*** 0.10 0.37*** -0.37*** 0.24***          
12 -0.16** 0.52*** 0.45*** 0.43*** -0.22** -0.58*** 0.28*** 0.41*** -0.54*** 0.77*** 0.23***         
13 -0.13 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.33*** -0.15* -0.54*** 0.21*** 0.34*** -0.50*** 0.75*** 0.23*** 0.97***        
14 -0.17** 0.57*** 0.43*** 0.50*** -0.29*** -0.59*** 0.33*** 0.45*** -0.54*** 0.75*** 0.22*** 0.97*** 0.87***       
15 -0.14** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.25*** -0.09 -0.39*** 0.24*** 0.29*** -0.36*** 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.39*** 0.35*** 0.40***      
16 0.19** 0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.20*** 0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 0.05     
17 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01    
18 0.10 -0.31*** -0.39*** -0.22*** 0.22** 0.33*** -0.12* -0.24*** 0.29*** -0.55*** -0.11 -0.63*** -0.61*** -0.60*** -0.15** 0.02 0.00   
19 0.01 -0.06 -0.15** -0.02 0.07 0.14* -0.17** -0.10 0.17** -0.19*** -0.01 -0.15** -0.11 -0.17** -0.08 -0.08 0.68*** 0.30***  
20 -0.09 0.44*** 0.76*** 0.25*** -0.00 -0.40*** 0.24*** 0.25*** -0.39*** 0.86*** 0.15** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.73*** 0.31*** -0.06 0.03 -0.59*** -0.14* 
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Figure 1 – Level of specialization of biotechnological companies 
The Figure shows the histogram for classes within Biotech Patents and Partners Patents, for our sample E. It excludes cases of 
zero classes (due to zero patents). 
 
Panel A – biotech 
Corresponds to the variable Biotech Classes. It excludes 78 cases of zero classes (due to zero patents). 
 
 
Panel B – partners 
It excludes 107 cases of zero classes (due to zero patents and possibly zero deals). Note that unit of analysis here is the pool of 
partners.  
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Table 4 – Results 
The Table presents the results of alternative probit models. All models control for industry effects and time. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the pharma company level, are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. Models B exclude cases 
with zero Upstream Patents. 
 
 
Model (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (B1) (B2) 
Upstream Patents    0.0004605 (0.00031) 
0.0012581 
(0.0014917) 
-0.0003946 
(0.0007087) 
Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio    -0.6084625 (0.6580661) 
-4.552329** 
(2.013632) 
-2.895428 
(2.444808) 
Dissimilarity     35.59048*** (12.41138)  
Complementarity      -6.283886*** (1.86395) 
Partners Knowledge Dispersion     13.39961*** (4.678663) 
3.371424** 
(1.405349) 
Partners No Patent      2.480849** (1.114179) 
3.475881* 
(2.083252) 
Biotech Classes    -0.1054819 (0.0640501) 
0.0977621 
(0.0849748) 
-0.0422711 
(0.0893393) 
Upstream MA   0.2056085 (0.1258541) 
0.7401273** 
(0.2989838) 
4.196928*** 
(1.613973) 
0.6469116** 
(0.3145717) 
Upstream SA   -0.1826186*** (0.0671454) 
-0.3276314** 
(0.1456337) 
-2.701515** 
(1.067067) 
-0.3459938* 
(0.1995506) 
Upstream HC SA       
Upstream LC SA       
Other Vertical SA -0.5665795* (0.316844) 
-0.5927921** 
(0.3139478) 
-0.4646432 
(0.3089432) 
0.2011312 
(0.3971517) 
1.214552 
(0.9267981) 
0.4993909 
(0.568257) 
Own Vertical SA 0.9983417*** (0.2525285) 
1.057216*** 
(0.3153217) 
0.9794228*** 
(0.3427316) 
0.8634734** 
(0.4201371) 
8.413154*** 
(2.581105) 
1.14213 
(0.7045262) 
Pharma U.S. -0.5237233 (0.3599466) 
-0.2440444 
(0.2618392) 
-0.3201962 
(0.291003) 
0.311859 
(0.6699128) 
0.6045358 
(3.846964) 
0.722788 
(0.678309) 
Biotech U.S.  1.124578** (0.4525807) 
0.9581687** 
(0.4043911) 
0.5410075 
(0.3521303) 
1.17865 
(0.7364819) 
12.45168*** 
(4.051034) 
1.546445** 
(0.6683081) 
Same Nation  0.1412451 (0.4011774) 
-0.1235507 
(0.2588062) 
-0.0009105 
(0.3070685) 
0.1600301 
(0.7280088) 
-0.2738365 
(3.500686) 
-0.5116357 
(0.72024) 
Biotech Assets 0.0000433 (0.0000603) 
-0.0000514 
(0.000043) 
0.0000172 
(0.0000361) 
0.0003581 
(0.0002471) 
0.0002823** 
(0.0001188) 
0.0002677*** 
(0.0000924) 
Constant -0.9042972 (0.6248261) 
-3.464825*** 
(0.5682005) 
-3.232207*** 
(0.5124773) 
-4.581558*** 
(1.062518) 
-63.95065*** 
(21.08339) 
-6.98576*** 
(1.336719) 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.9311 0.8966 0.9095 0.9519 0.9766 0.9629 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.4793 0.3783 0.4091 0.5719 0.6997 0.6221 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Clusters (pharma) 85 99 99 82 82 82 
Observations (deals) 157 186 186 125 125 125 
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APPENDIX B – secondary figures and tables 
Table 5 – Robustness to alternative knowledge controls 
The Table is analogous to Table 4 (models B), except that variable Biotech Patents replaces the variable Upstream Patents. 
*P<10%*; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
Model (B1) (B2) 
Biotech Patents 0.0072349 (0.0082925) 
-0.0003223 
(0.0124506) 
Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio -4.979207** (2.27157) 
-2.727916 
(2.494728) 
Dissimilarity 36.1446*** (11.8611)  
Complementarity  -5.873368*** (1.814128) 
Partners Knowledge Dispersion 14.05075*** (4.718917) 
3.123145** 
(1.42284) 
Partners No Patent  2.945722** (1.313618) 
3.225577 
(2.101892) 
Biotech Classes 0.0902127 (0.1016238) 
-0.0457169 
(0.1180491) 
Upstream MA 3.989538*** (1.341867) 
0.6783155** 
(0.3071863) 
Upstream SA -2.572518*** (0.8816755) 
-0.3863572** 
(0.1819195) 
Upstream HC SA   
Upstream LC SA   
Other Vertical SA 1.166251 (0.8734766) 
0.5213559 
(0.5235258) 
Own Vertical SA 8.657354*** (2.498953) 
1.170504 
(0.7151435) 
Pharma U.S. -4.67829 (3.250625) 
0.5523605 
(0.5978552) 
Biotech U.S.  14.97915** (5.884755) 
1.607239** 
(0.7361025) 
Same Nation  5.177952 (3.372954) 
-0.3873933 
(0.659965) 
Biotech Assets 0.0002626** (0.0001144) 
0.0002757*** 
(0.0000907) 
Constant -67.31037*** (22.13312) 
-6.90756*** 
(1.368463) 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.9753 0.9622 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.6986 0.6210 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Clusters (pharma) 82 82 
Observations (deals) 125 125 
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Table 6 – Robustness to alternative deal controls 
The Table is analogous to Table 4 (models B), except that variable Upstream HC SA and Upstream LC SA replace the variable 
Upstream SA. *P<10%*; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
Model (B1) (B2) 
Upstream Patents 0.0006191 (0.0014176) 
-0.0007355 
(0.0009758) 
Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio -7.051704*** (2.204536) 
-4.164205* 
(2.204536) 
Dissimilarity 36.81558*** (10.96287)  
Complementarity  -6.758551*** (2.154692) 
Partners Knowledge Dispersion 14.85915*** (3.987402) 
5.019122*** 
(1.601679) 
Partners No Patent  4.246713*** (1.531644) 
5.108408** 
(2.125122) 
Biotech Classes 0.2499233** (0.1002764) 
-0.0069137 
(0.0564745) 
Upstream MA 3.927232*** (1.275999) 
0.5175611* 
(0.2830072) 
Upstream SA   
 
 
Upstream HC SA -3.768397*** (1.084137) 
-0.8902064*** 
(0.3001662) 
Upstream LC SA -2.372548** (0.9393867) 
-0.1298979 
(0.2562074) 
Other Vertical SA 0.8424977 (0.8820536) 
0.5553574 
(0.6064981) 
Own Vertical SA 9.751172*** (2.268078) 
1.597725** 
(0.6695509) 
Pharma U.S. -6.016753 (3.689073) 
0.634207 
(0.8369923) 
Biotech U.S.  15.50904*** (4.559765) 
1.587203** 
(0.7174402) 
Same Nation  6.154392* (3.647569) 
-0.3486459 
(0.67554) 
Biotech Assets 0.0002628** (0.0001117) 
0.0002605** 
(0.0001112) 
Constant -69.61162*** (19.22503) 
-8.196646*** 
(1.502705) 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.9794 0.9677 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.7133 0.6415 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Clusters (pharma) 82 82 
Observations (deals) 125 125 
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Table 7 – Robustness to inclusion of pharma deal experience 
The Table is analogous to Table 4 (model B2), except that we add variables Pharma MA – number of vertical MA established by 
the pharma leg of the vertical deal, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding the event year) – and Pharma SA – 
number of vertical SA established by the pharma leg of the vertical deal, within 4 years prior to the vertical link event (excluding 
the event year). Sample A was used to compute these variables. Results for model B1 are not presented, as convergence was not 
achieved. *P<10%*; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
Model (B2) 
Upstream Patents -0.0015758* (0.0008893) 
Biotech-to-Upstream Patents Ratio -2.522594 (2.406654) 
Dissimilarity  
Complementarity -6.675304*** (2.119292) 
Partners Knowledge Dispersion 4.418576*** (1.505755) 
Partners No Patent  3.746152* (2.075916) 
Biotech Classes -0.1044899 (0.0930259) 
Upstream MA 0.7880926** (0.3641742) 
Upstream SA -0.2014026 (0.2092514) 
Upstream HC SA  
Upstream LC SA  
Other Vertical SA 0.2050096 (0.5228911) 
Own Vertical SA -0.9269861 (0.8782442) 
Pharma MA 0.8591314*** (0.3238183) 
Pharma SA -0.1395421 (0.1396416) 
Pharma U.S. 1.150504* (0.6620684) 
Biotech U.S.  1.797834** (0.7731881) 
Same Nation  -1.312133* (0.7172104) 
Biotech Assets 0.0003275** (0.0001302) 
Constant -7.825538*** (1.517522) 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.9698 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.6508 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 
Clusters (pharma) 82 
Observations (deals) 125 
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Table 8 – Testing the alternative explanations – pharma financial constraints and size 
The Table is analogous to Table 4 except that we focus on variables Pharma Assets – total assets of the pharma leg of the vertical 
deal, reported 1 year prior to the event year – and Pharma OCF – operating cash flow of the pharma leg of the vertical deal, 
reported 1 year prior to the event year. Note that the observations in models C1 to C3 depart from baseline sample with further 
additional constraints on data availability from WRDS (North American Compustat data). Model C4 departs from sample E with 
further constraints on data availability from WRDS (North American Compustat data) at pharma variables Pharma Assets  and 
Pharma OCF. *P<10%*; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
Model (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) 
Upstream Patents    -0.0173207 (0.0276303) 
Upstream MA   -0.070661 (0.1745629) 
0.1328951 
(0.4619224) 
Upstream SA   -0.1804755*** (0.0667835) 
-0.6553494*** 
(0.2442326) 
Other Vertical SA   -0.6974715 (0.4431186) 
-0.7830496 
(0.5535991) 
Own Vertical SA   0.3015001 (0.6947488) 
0.2204666 
(0.8093782) 
Pharma U.S.   1.180769* (0.6491745) 
1.337908 
(0.9771603) 
Biotech U.S.    -0.6613857 (0.5586514) 
-1.271078 
(0.9389101) 
Same Nation    0.719692 (0.6922558) 
1.381137 
(0.9333125) 
Biotech Assets  -0.000101*** (0.0000374) 
-0.000000 
(0.0000429) 
0.0009301 
(0.0006677) 
Pharma Assets -0.0001118** (0.0000504) 
0.0000571 
(0.0000605) 
0.0000767* 
(0.0000462) 
0.000405 
(0.0000896) 
Pharma OCF  0.0005399 (0.0003422) 
-0.0002551 
(0.0002899) 
-0.0005131 
(0.0003272) 
0.0002678 
(0.0008022) 
Constant -1.220263*** (0.2189548) 
-2.192018*** 
(0.7273224) 
-3.134976*** 
(1.138975) 
-6.059128*** 
(1.372889) 
Area Under ROC Curve 0.6988 0.8484 0.9153 0.9562 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.0992 0.2641 0.4318 0.6539 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Clusters (pharma) 71 40 40 26 
Observations (deals) 226 100 100 67 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we examine the impact of SOX Section 404 on long-term investment of 
small innovative companies. We hypothesise that R&D intensity increases the impact 
of SOX 404 on long-term investment. Making use of a quasi-natural experiment, our 
results suggest that the impact of SOX Section 404 on companies’ long-term 
investment is uneven, favouring R&D intensive companies. This may call for a re-
centring of policy discussion around the distribution of the net benefit of coercive 
financial disclosure programs versus the overall economic impact of those programs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is long-term investment affected by coercive financial disclosure? We find arguments 
pointing in opposing directions. On the one hand, coercive financial disclosure may 
foster companies’ long-term investment due to a decrease in information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders. However, on the other hand, coercive financial 
disclosure may hinder long-term investment due to an increase in direct and indirect 
costs of compliance. 
Public companies are associated with information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. In the financial markets, outsiders’ confidence on financial reporting is an 
essential element for a proper functioning of financial markets because their 
investment decisions rely on disclosed information. Coercive financial disclosure 
arises by the need to improve or restore public confidence in financial reporting. From 
the late 1990’s to the early 2000’s a series of accounting and auditing scandals eroded 
public confidence – of which Enron and Worldcom are the most preeminent examples 
– and motivated to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the most significant 
change in securities’ regulation since Securities Act 1933.  
Section 404 of SOX is one of the most important and contentious components SOX 
[Zhang (2007); and, Coates and Srinivasan (2014)]. SOX 404 Section– designated 
“management assessment of internal controls” – requires most publicly registered 
companies to include on their annual report a management’s assessment on the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting along with an 
external auditor’s verification on this assessment. This is intended to improve quality 
of financial disclosure and thus, it is expected to impact the confidence and the 
monitoring power of external investors, solving adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. There is evidence consistent with the positive impact of SOX 404 on the 
quality of firms’ information environment [Alexander et al. (2013)]1. Accordingly, we 
find proponents of the idea that SOX 404 would ultimately foster companies’ long-
term investment, through a decrease in the cost of capital driven by a decrease in 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders [Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “SEC administered the survey between December of 2008 and January of 2009. Managers from 
2,901 unique U.S. public companies participated in the survey […] 80% of respondents ascribe some 
benefits to Section 404 compliance. Large fractions of respondents cite a positive impact of compliance 
on the quality of their firm's internal control structure (73%), their audit committee's confidence in the 
ICFR (71%), the quality of their firm's financial reporting (48%), and their firm's ability to prevent and 
detect fraud (47%)” [Alexander et al. (2013)]. 
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(2009); Singer and You (2011); Arping and Sautner (2013); Andrade et al. (2014); 
and, Albuquerque and Zhu (WP2014)].  
However, we also find proponents of a concurring idea. SOX 404 may hinder long-
term investment because it increases direct and indirect costs of compliance 
[Bargeron et al. (2010); and, Kang et al. (2010)]. Regarding direct costs, the argument 
is that the increase in compliance costs implies more severe financial constraints 
(namely, to long-term investment). There is evidence consistent with the positive 
impact of SOX 404 on audit fees, internal labor costs, outside consultants and other 
miscellaneous expenses [Alexander et al. (2013)]. Regarding indirect costs, the 
argument is that risky projects (namely, long-term investments) may be sacrificed, as 
they are associated with more weaknesses in financial reporting – which increase 
direct costs of compliance if weaknesses are addressed or stock price decline and/or 
litigation if weaknesses are not addressed. These potential unintended consequences 
of SOX echoed on policy and business domains. Allan Greenspan stated, “corporate 
executives and boards of directors are seemingly unclear, in the wake of the recent 
intense focus on corporate behaviour, about how an increase in risk-taking on their 
part would be viewed by shareholders and regulators. As a result, business leaders 
have been quite circumspect about embarking on major new investments”2. William 
Donaldson, Chairman of SEC stated, “I worry about the loss of risk-taking zeal. […] 
[as it results in a] huge preoccupation with the dangers and risks of making the 
slightest mistake, as opposed to a reasonable approach to legitimate business risk”3. 
Finally, Alan Eisenberg, on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry Organization, 
stated, “many emerging biotech companies are directing precious resources from 
core research and development of new therapies for patients due to overly complex 
controls or unnecessary evaluation controls”4.  
It is not surprising that the attention of scholars has been gravitating on the costs and 
benefits and on indirect consequences of SOX 404 implementation – in particular, the 
impact on corporate long-term investment. To our knowledge, the existing evidence 
suggests that compliance is (on average) positively associated with corporate 
investment [Albuquerque and Zhu (WP2014)]. While we find this compelling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Testimony of Chairman Allan Greenspan before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives, July 15, 2003. 
3 Adrian Michaels. After a year of US corporate clean-up, William Donaldson calls for a return to risk- 
taking. FinancialTimes.com, July 24, 2003. 
4 Comment letter to the SEC, July 12, 2007. 
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evidence, we think it is likely, as with virtually any policy intervention, that the net 
benefits of coercive financial disclosure – namely, those of SOX Section 404 – are 
heterogeneous across companies. To our knowledge, we are the first to investigate 
heterogeneity in this context. We hypothesise and find supportive evidence that R&D 
intensity increases the impact of SOX 404 on long-term investment.  
Our findings are mostly relevant because they contribute to enrich the discussion 
around SOX. The suggestion that coercive financial disclosure (at least of this type) is 
an “uneven game” that favours R&D intensive companies may call for a re-centring 
of policy discussion around the distribution of the net benefit of coercive financial 
disclosure programs versus the overall economic impact of those programs. 
Moreover, we find no empirical support to the arguments relating an increase in direct 
and indirect costs of compliance with a decrease in corporate investment, and find 
empirical support to those relating a decrease in information asymmetry with an 
increase in corporate investment. This motivates further research as, for instance, 
other dimensions of information asymmetry could be relevant. 
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HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Decrease in asymmetric information 
Disclosure plays a role on solving moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
associated with companies’ financing decisions. Moral hazard arises with the 
separation between ownership and control. In these circumstances managers may take 
investment or financing decisions that are not in the best interest of shareholders – a 
typical agency problem [Jensen and Meckling, (1976)]. Even in the absence 
conflicting interests between managers and shareholders, moral hazard may also arise 
with co-existence of debt and equity. In these circumstance companies may take 
investment or financing decisions that are not in the best interest of debt holders 
[Jensen and Meckling, (1976), Smith and Warner (1979)]. In both situations the moral 
hazard arises because, after a financing contract is established (either equity or debt), 
companies’ decision makers may take further decisions that deviate and harm other 
contract parties. Adverse selection, on the other hand, arises from ex ante information 
asymmetry between contract parties of a financing contract, and corresponds to a 
typical lemons problem. It has been argued that optimal contracts between insiders 
(managers) and outsiders (investors) is a potential solution for both lemons and 
agency problems, because they will frequently require insiders to reveal relevant 
information to outsiders, allowing more effective monitoring (which eases moral 
hazard) and mitigating misvaluation problems (which eases adverse selection) [Healy 
and Palepu (2001)]. In line with this, a vast literature suggests that higher disclosure 
(in general) and a higher quality financial reporting (in particular) decreases the cost 
of (external) capital [Diamond and Verrecchia (1991); Welker (1995); Botosan 
(1997); Healy et al. (1999); Leuz and Verrechia (2000); Bushman and Smith (2001); 
Healy and Palepu (2001); Botosan and Plumlee (2002); Bens and Monahan (2004); 
and, Lambert et al. (2007)]5. Under this perspective, investors demand a premium for 
bearing information risk6, which decreases with disclosure [Healy and Palepu (2001)].  
This is consistent with the literature suggesting that SOX (in general) and Section 404 
(in particular) reduced the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders – 
through a more reliable/accurate financial reporting – leading to a decrease in the cost 
of capital  [Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009); Singer and You (2011); Arping and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 They mainly focus on voluntary disclosure. 
6 This is in line with the notion of ‘estimation risk’ [Barry and Brown (1985)]. 
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Sautner (2013); Andrade et al. (2014); and, Albuquerque and Zhu (WP2014)]. 
Accordingly, one would expect that by lowering the cost of capital, Section 404 of 
SOX would ultimately foster companies’ long-term investment. Because R&D 
intensive companies have higher levels of information asymmetry [Aboody and Lev 
(2000); and, Iliev (2010)], keeping everything else constant, we would expect them to 
experience a relative higher decrease in the cost of capital. 
 
Increase in direct and indirect costs of compliance 
However, a concurring argument has been presented in the SOX 404 context. 
According to this alternative perspective, SOX 404 may hinder long-term investment 
because it increases direct costs and indirect costs of compliance.  
Direct costs 
According to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that public companies’ annual reports should include 
companies’ own assessment of internal control over financial reporting, and that this 
is attested by an auditor7. Management must identify the financial reporting risks, the 
controls that address them and provide evidence (documentation) to provide support 
for its assessment on whether internal control is effective. Assessment is based on 
control deficiencies identified and the extent to which they constitute a material 
weakness8. Part of the controversy around Section 404 is that its compliance is costly 
and that this burdens companies distinctively. The discussion around Section 404 of 
SOX indicates that size and organizational complexity are the most significant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 According to SEC Release 33-8238 and 34-47986, 14 August 2003, the report “contains: [1.] a 
statement of management's responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control 
over financial reporting for the company; [2.] a statement identifying the framework used by 
management to conduct the required evaluation of the effectiveness of the company's internal control 
over financial reporting; [3.] management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
control over financial reporting as of the end of the company's most recent fiscal year, including a 
statement as to whether or not the company's internal control over financial reporting is effective. The 
assessment must include disclosure of any ‘material weaknesses’ in the company's internal control 
over financial reporting identified by management. Management is not permitted to conclude that the 
company's internal control over financial reporting is effective if there are one or more material 
weaknesses in the company's internal control over financial reporting; and, [4.] a statement that the 
registered public accounting firm that audited the financial statements included in the annual report 
has issued an attestation report on management's assessment of the registrant's internal control over 
financial reporting.” 
8 According to SEC Release 33-8810 and 34-55929, 27 June 2007, a material weakness is “a 
deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in ICFR [Internal Control over Financial Reporting] such 
that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the registrant’s annual or interim 
financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.” 
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compliance cost determinants9. Based on this, we assume that the increase in direct 
costs of compliance is homogeneous across levels of R&D intensity. 
Indirect costs 
It has been argued that investing in risky projects increases the likelihood of reporting 
material weaknesses, and that these can lead to stock price decline and/or litigation10. 
According to this perspective, to minimize material weaknesses companies would 
avoid risky investments [Bargeron et al. (2010); Kang et al. (2010); and, Albuquerque 
and Zhu (WP2014)].  
Since long-term investment of R&D intensive companies is likely to involve riskier 
projects, this perspective suggests that the long-term investment of these companies to 
be particularly hindered by SOX 404. However, if investing in risky projects 
increases the likelihood of reporting material weaknesses, an alternative plausible 
solution (to material weaknesses avoidance) would be that companies solve material 
weaknesses through a more effective (and arguably costly) internal control over 
financial reporting. We assume that companies’ willingness to minimize material 
weaknesses through avoidance only increases if solving material weaknesses is costly. 
In that case, we would expect a clear association between direct costs of compliance 
and level of risky project on the extensive discussion around direct compliance cost 
determinants. We don’t find that. As such, we interpret this absence of discussion as 
evidence of either: investing in risky projects does not increase the likelihood of 
reporting material weaknesses; or, it does, but material weaknesses of this type do not 
lead to stock price decline and/or litigation.  
 
Hypothesis 
While SOX 404 may hinder long-term investment due to increase in direct and 
indirect costs of compliance, we assume this impact is homogeneous across levels of 
R&D intensity, and hypothesise the following. 
Hypothesis – R&D intensity increases the impact of SOX 404 on long-term 
investment.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 According to SEC Release 33-8238 and 34-47986, 14 August 2003, “many commenters indicated 
that even the more limited definition related to financial reporting that we proposed will impose 
substantial reporting and cost burdens on companies […] We believe that there will be a marked 
disparity of burdens and costs resulting from the new internal control requirements between the largest 
and smallest reporting companies. […] This burden will also vary among companies based on the 
complexity of their organization and the nature of their current internal control procedures.” 
10 Triggered by (outside) investors. 
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EMPIRICS 
We implement a natural quasi-experiment to find further evidence on the impact of 
financial disclosure on long-term investment of small (non-financial, U.S. 
incorporated) innovative companies. In particular, we implement a regression 
discontinuity design using Section 404 of SOX to assess whether R&D intensity 
increases the impact of SOX 404 on long-term investment.  
 
Context 
Passed in 2002, SOX introduced a set of new or expanded disclosure requirements for 
public companies, aiming to improve quality of financial reporting and, in turn, 
outside investor confidence. One of the most debated items of SOX is Section 404. 
According to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that public companies’ annual reports should include 
companies’ own assessment of internal control over financial reporting, and that this 
is attested by an auditor. Hereafter, we refer to this as management report. 
Implementation of Section 404 for small firms is different from that of large firms. 
This is because these requirements have important compliance costs that impact 
smaller firms disproportionately (due to non-negligible fixed costs involved). While 
most U.S. public companies had to file their management report with audit 
assessment along with annual reports for the fiscal year ending on or after November 
15, 2004, small firms were under an exception rule as follows. Companies with a 
public float11 above $75 million in their reports for fiscal years 2002 (from November 
2002 to October 2003), 2003 (from November 2003 to October 2004) or 2004 (from 
November 2004 to October 2005) were required to comply with Section 40412. 
Hereafter, we refer to these firms as MR companies. Companies with a public float 
under $75 million in their reports for fiscal years 2002, 2003 or 2004 were not 
required to comply with Section 40413. Hereafter, we refer to these firms as non-MR !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Public float is the part of equity that is not held by managers or large shareholders. It is reported on 
10-k filing front page. 
12 These are companies considered accelerated filers by SEC. Accelerated filler status was introduced 
in December 15, 2002 by SEC. Once a company is classified as such, it is classified as such thereafter 
(with very few exceptions, not present in our sample). Accelerated filers have to file the 10-k report 
within 75 days of their fiscal year-end, while non-accelerated filers have to file the 10-k report within 
90 days of their fiscal year-end. Every year the status is defined based on public float threshold.  
13 These are companies considered non-accelerated filers by SEC. 
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companies. These companies finally had to submit an MR without audit assessment in 
the fiscal year 2007, and finally had to submit an MR with audit assessment in 201014. 
 
Identification 
We make use of this compliance rule for small companies to implement a regression 
discontinuity design15. In concrete, we compare the outcomes of companies in the 
neighbourhood of the $75 million threshold – between $50 million and $100 million – 
using the following model. 
 ! ! !!!!!!!" ! !!!!!!"!!!!!"!!!!" ! !!!"#!!"#$% ! !!! ! ! 
 
MR is a dummy variable that identifies companies that filed a management report. 
R&DI is a measure of R&D intensity, specified on data section. MR.R&DI is a term 
that interacts MR and R&DI, and the coefficient associated to it is the coefficient of 
interest. PFL Terms is a vector of the public float terms (polynomial of degree 3)16, 
with PFL being the public float reported at the event fiscal year (2004). Y is the 
dependent variable and X is a vector of industry and company level controls, both 
specified below17, 18. 
Limiting the analysis to observations that lie within the neighbourhood of the 
threshold is appealing because enhances the likelihood that assignment to treatment is 
(as good as) random. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
While the compliance rule implies a clear discontinuity in the probability of 
submitting a management report at the threshold of $75 million, internal validity also 
requires that the threshold and PFL are determined independently of each other. In 
this particular empirical context, this condition may be jeopardized because some 
companies may manipulate PFL after knowing the threshold, choosing the most 
favourable side of the threshold. Figure 1 shows evidence that manipulation may be in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See Iliev (2010) for a more detailed description of this context. 
15 The implementation of a regression discontinuity design in this context is not new. Iliev (2010) and 
Albuquerque and Zhu (WP2014) use similar identification strategies.  
16 To control for any direct effects of public float on the outcome variables. 
17 Section “Variables and descriptive statistics”. 
18 We also report results for a difference-in-differences approach. 
! 82!
place. In the event year (2004) there is a significant jump in the density at the 
threshold, when compared to years 2002 and 2003. Some companies seem to be 
evading filling a management report by manipulating their public float19. In this case, 
it is reasonable to suspect that the OLS will be biased (not capturing the true effect of 
rule compliance) because compliers and non-compliers could differ in unobserved 
factors that would impact Y.  
We use an instrumental variables approach to overcome this empirical challenge, 
using the following two-stage model. 
 !" ! !! ! !!!!"#!"#$$#! !!!!!!" ! !!!!"!!!!" ! !!! ! ! ! ! !! ! !!!!" ! !!!!!!" ! !!!!"!!!!" ! !!! ! ! 
 
MR is a dummy variable that identifies companies that filed a management report. 
PFL752002 is a dummy variable that identifies companies that reported a public float 
higher than $75 million in the fiscal year 2002. R&DI is a measure of R&D intensity, 
specified below20. MR.R&DI is a term that interacts MR and R&DI, and the 
coefficient associated to it on the second stage regression is the coefficient of interest. 
Y is the dependent variable and X is a vector of controls, both specified below21. 
The validity of the instrument is assured because: PFL752002 strongly predicts MR 
by design of the rule – companies that reported a public float higher than $75 million 
in the fiscal year 2002 immediately become accelerated fillers and had to submit a 
management report in the fiscal year 2004; and, PFL752002 has no direct effect on Y 
– it is unlikely that this dummy variable would impact companies’ long-term 
investment outcomes (like CAPEX and R&D), particularly in the neighbourhood of 
$75 million; PFL752002 is not subject to manipulation – the rule was defined after 
companies defined the public float of 200222. 
An accelerated filler status implies two simultaneous treatments: file a management 
report and to file the 10-k report sooner. We assume that this last difference has no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Companies can do so by increasing large shareholders and/or management holdings, and/or by 
decreasing the value of equity outstanding (through share repurchase) [Gao et al. (2009), Iliev (2010), 
and Nondorf et al. (2012)]. Evidence of manipulation was already found by Iliev (2010). Yet, we 
provide further evidence on its drivers on section “Results”. 
20 Section “Variables and descriptive statistics”. 
21 Section “Variables and descriptive statistics”. 
22 While SEC introduced accelerated filler status in December 15, 2002, the rule of compliance with a 
management report was published in June 2003. Public float in year 2002 is the public float observed 
in their second fiscal quarter-end. 
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impact on companies’ long-term investment outcomes (like CAPEX and R&D). 
Lastly, it must hold that companies are following the rule. Iliev (2010) provides 
strong evidence that they do23.   
 
Sample 
Table 1 describes the sample generating process of the main (long-term) analysis 
sample. We depart from a database developed by Iliev (2010) that comprises a sample 
of 1492 non-financial U.S. incorporated companies with market equity between $30 
and $330 million24. We dropped 653 companies because they do not fulfil our 
eligibility criteria in terms of R&D and CAPEX – our main long-term investment 
outcomes. In particular, we collect annual data on Compustat of both R&D and 
CAPEX between January 1 2002 and December 31 2010, and keep 839 companies 
that reported R&D and CAPEX both before and after the event year (2004)25. Next 
we excluded 627 companies that did not fulfil our bandwidth criterion, and keep 212 
companies that reported public float between $50 and $100 million in the event year 
(2004). Next, we dropped 29 companies for which the reported a public float in 2004 
did not correspond to their second fiscal quarter-end, and 1 firm that could be 
considered an outlier in terms of the assets reported in 200426. After employing these 
further restrictions, we keep 182 companies on our main (long-term analysis) sample. 
Some robustness tests involve 2 alternative measures of the dependent variables of 
interest, each of which potentially corresponding to 2 different samples: the short-
term analysis sample, and the alternative long-term analysis sample. As we explain 
below, our short-term analysis sample has further restrictions related with the 
operationalization of the dependent variables. This implies dropping only 1 additional 
company from our main (long-term analysis) sample. Our alternative long-term 
analysis sample has fewer restrictions related with the operationalization of the 
dependent variables. Yet, this has no implications on sample size. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 As explained in the data section, we depart from database developed by Iliev (2010), and focus on a 
subset of the sample where he tests rule implementation. As such, evidence could be even higher in our 
case. 
24 Iliev (2010) uses Compustat for market capitalization and accounting data and collects data on public 
float and management reports from companies’ annual 10-k fillings. This sample of 1492 companies 
excludes financial companies because these have already similar regulation in place.   
25 This is further explained below (section: variables and descriptive statistics).   
26 While low public float is supposed to be associated with small firms, we add this further constraint to 
foster the precision on identifying small firms. In any case, results do not change significantly if this 
company is included.   
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[Table 1 around here] 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
Variables and descriptive statistics 
Table 2 describes the variables of the main (long-term) analysis sample. Dependent 
variables are outcomes of the long-term investment measured after (and including) the 
event year (2004), namely: (1) CAPEX plus R&D after, (2) CAPEX after, and (3) 
R&D after27. We measure R&D intensity as the ratio R&D Before to assets reported 
in event year (2004)28. We control for the following company level characteristics: (8) 
Assets to account for potentially remaining differences in size; (9) Leverage Ratio to 
account for possible effects of financing decisions on long-term investment decisions; 
and, to account for persistent factors that affect long-term investment decisions, we 
include the long-term investment outcome corresponding to the dependent variable 
measured before (and excluding) the event year (2004), namely: (4) CAPEX plus 
R&D before, (5) CAPEX before, and (6) R&D before. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. On average, R&D is higher 
than CAPEX both before and after. The basic descriptive statistics of Assets further 
justifies the reason why we dropped one firm with assets higher than $2000 million. 
Moreover, there is a significant negative correlation between R&D and CAPEX, both 
before and after, and significant positive lagged correlation for each. Comparing the 
means between MR and non-MR companies is further informative. The differences in 
means of most outcomes of the long-term investment are statistically significant, both 
before and after, further justifying controlling for pre-event long-term investment !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 In line with the literature, we define long-term investment as expenses designed to generate benefits 
over the long-term and, as such, include in the analysis both capital expenditures (CAPEX) and 
research and development expenses (R&D). It is worth noting that CAPEX and R&D are usually 
subject to a distinct accounting treatment – typically, CAPEX are capitalized (thus, an asset is created 
when expensed), and R&D is expensed as incurred (thus, no asset is created when expensed). The 
argument behind this distinction is that the benefits from R&D are highly uncertain, when compared to 
CAPEX. 
28 While this may be a relative consensual measure of R&D intensity, we try alternative measures for 
which results are presented on section “Results”. 
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outcome corresponding to the dependent variable. Figure 2 further explores the 
differences in means between groups of dependent variables and highlights no evident 
changing pattern around the event year (2004). 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
We are aware of the problems associated to missing data. In our case, this is a 
particular sensitive issue on R&D data. We do have a lot of missing data for R&D 
between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 201029. We decided restrict the analysis 
to non-missing data observations30, and thus our analysis is conditional on reporting at 
least one non-missing value for R&D and CAPEX before and after the event year 
(2004). 
 
Results 
Estimation results for main long-term analysis are provided on Tables 4 and 5. If 
impact of SOX 404 on non-innovators (R&D intensity equals zero) is captured by the 
coefficient associated to MR, IV estimations suggest that SOX Section 404 impacts 
negatively on total investment (CAPEX plus R&D), with no positive impact on R&D. 
Moreover, the differences to OLS suggest that non-innovative companies that 
expected a significant negative impact on total investment evaded regulation31. 
The coefficient associated to !"!!!!" is positively and statistically significant on 
all IV estimations, supporting our hypothesis. Taken together, this suggests that the 
impact of SOX Section 404 is contingent on the level of R&D intensity, and that the 
overall impact on companies’ long-term investment can vary from negative to 
positive. As evidenced in Figure 3, our IV results predict a negative impact of SOX 
404 for more than 80% of small innovative companies in the sample (those with 
lower level of R&D intensity). 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 For a discussion on missing R&D data see Koh and Reeb (2015). 
30 As opposed to other empirical alternatives, such as: replacing missing R&D with zero; replacing 
R&D industry average; or, replacing R&D with some historical value from prior years.  
31 Results of cross section OLS are not clearly robust to an alternative approach – Difference-in-
differences – as reported in Table 11.  
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[Table 5 around here] 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Robustness tests 
Our first set of robustness tests involve 2 alternative measures of the dependent 
variables of interest: [1] in the short-term analysis the dependent variables of interest 
are defined for a narrower time window, just including the event year (2004); and, [2] 
in the alternative long-term analysis the dependent variables of interest are defined for 
a broader time window, including data till December 31, 2010. As mentioned above, 
this imposes few restrictions on sample size, and these are confined to the short-term 
analysis. Tables 6 and 7 show that results are mostly insensitive to these alternative 
measures of the dependent variables. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
We also find that results are robust if we alternatively measure R&DI by scaling R&D 
Before by sales (as opposed to assets) in the event year (2004)32. Table 8 reports 
results for this alternative. 
 
[Table 8 around here] 
 
To minimize the possibilities of omitted-variable bias, we further include the 
following controls. First, since it can be argued that investment depends on 
companies’ profitability or growth opportunities, we include the variables CFO and 
MTB33, corresponding to cash flow from operations and market to book (value of 
equity) ratio, measured in the event year (2004), respectively. Second, SEC 
guidance34 suggests that larger and more complex companies have higher likelihood !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Scaling R&D by sales has been extensively used as a measure of R&D intensity – among others, 
Katila and Ahuja (2002). 
33 MTB is the inverted BE/ME (book value of equity divided by the market value of equity), as defined 
by Iliev (2010). CFO is scaled by previous-year total assets, also in line with Iliev (2010). 
34 SEC Release 33-8810 and 34-55929; June 27, 2007. 
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of reporting financial misstatements. To the extent that this may impact direct and 
indirect compliance costs, it may impact our key dependent variables. While we focus 
on small companies and still control for size, in order to control for complexity, we 
include the variables Business Segments and Geographic Segments35, corresponding 
to the number of business segments and the number of geographic segments, 
respectively. Results are mostly insensitive to the inclusion of these additional 
controls. 
 
 [Table 9 around here] 
 
We assess whether results are sensitive to bandwidth definition. As reported in Table 
10, results are robust to a narrower bandwidth and not to a wider bandwidth. We 
attribute this last result to the fact that an increase in the bandwidth may be associated 
with an increase in bias from unobservable factors that might be correlated with both 
dependent and independent variables.   
 
[Table 10 around here] 
 
Finally, we assess whether results are sensitive to the instrument used (PFL2002 – 
public float reported in 2002 – instead of PFL752002 – a dummy variable that 
identifies companies that reported a public float higher than $75 million in the fiscal 
year 2002). Results are robust36. 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 This is also in line with Iliev (2010). 
36 These are enabled upon request. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of SOX Section 404 on long-
term investment of small innovative companies. In particular, we address the research 
question of whether R&D intensity increases the impact of SOX 404 on long-term 
investment. Combining Iliev (2010) database with further Compustat data, our main 
results support the hypothesis and suggest that the impact of SOX Section 404 on 
companies’ long-term investment can vary from negative to positive, positively 
depending on the level of R&D intensity. 
We think this is compelling evidence for several reasons. First, it suggests that both 
arguments – asymmetric information and costs of compliance – are in play. Second, it 
suggests that companies subject to coercive financial disclosure are forced to “play 
different games”, and that R&D intensive companies are relatively benefited. Third, it 
suggests that the argument ‘costs of compliance’ dominates the argument 
‘asymmetric information’ for nearly 90% of our sample of small innovative 
companies – challenging the findings that compliance is (on average) positively 
associated with corporate investment [Albuquerque and Zhu (WP2014)]. Finally, 
evidence of an “uneven game” suggests a re-centring of policy discussion around the 
distribution of the net benefit of coercive financial disclosure programs versus the 
overall economic impact of those programs. 
This motivates further research as, for instance, other dimensions of information 
asymmetry could be relevant. Furthermore, future research could focus on including 
acquisitions (as alternative investment mechanism), alternative empirical strategies to 
deal with missing values on R&D, address investment efficiency37, and disentangle 
accounting from investment decisions. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Biddle and Hilary (2006); and, Biddle et al. (2009). 
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APPENDIX A – main figures and tables 
Figure 1 – Evidence of PFL manipulation 
The figure shows the histogram for PFL till $150 million for firms with PFL lower than $75 million in years before. Firms 
included are eligible firms in terms of R&D and CAPEX. In general, these are firms for which we observe both R&D and 
CAPEX before and after the event year (2004). The eligibility criterion is defined on data section in more detail. Panel A has 710 
observations, Panel B has 516 observations, and panel C has 390 observations. Companies above the threshold in Panel A are not 
part of Panel B, as they become accelerated filers in year 2002. Companies above the threshold in Panel B are not part of Panel 
C, as they become accelerated filers in that 2003. Fiscal year 2002 comprises reports from November 2002 to October 2003. 
Fiscal year 2003 comprises reports from November 2003 to October 2004. Fiscal year 2004 comprises reports from November 
2004 to October 2005. 
 
 
Panel A – 2002 
 
Panel B – 2003 
 
Panel C – 2004 
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Table 1 – Sample generating process 
The Table describes the sample generating process of the main (long-term) analysis sample. We depart from a database 
developed by Iliev (2010) that comprises a sample of 1492 non-financial U.S. incorporated companies with market equity 
between $30 and $330 million. After employing further restrictions, we keep 182 companies on our main (long-term analysis) 
sample. Our short-term analysis sample has further restrictions related with the operationalization of the dependent variables. 
This implies dropping only 1 additional company from our main (long-term analysis) sample. Our alternative long-term analysis 
sample has fewer restrictions related with the operationalization of the dependent variables. Yet, this has no implications on 
sample size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Variable definitions 
The Table describes the variables of the main (long-term) analysis sample. Our short-term analysis sample has further restrictions 
related with the operationalization of the dependent variables (1) to (4). The time window is narrower and just includes the event 
year (2004). Our alternative long-term analysis sample has fewer restrictions related with the operationalization of the dependent 
variables (1) to (4). The time window is broader and includes data till December 31, 2010. CAPEX are the total funds used for 
additions to property, plant and equipment, excluding those associated with acquisitions (of companies).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sample Description Dropped firms 
Kept 
firms 
Non-financial with U.S. incorporation companies with market equity between $30 and $330 million - 1492 
Companies eligible in terms of R&D and CAPEX 653 839 
Companies with reported public float in 2004 between $50 and $100 million 627 212 
Companies with reliable reported public float in 2004 29 183 
Companies with assets in 2004 lower than $2000 million 1 182 
 Designation Description 
1 CAPEX plus R&D after Average of the sum of CAPEX and R&D reported between the event year (2004) and December 31, 2006, including the event year, considering only those observations for which there is non-missing values for both R&D and CAPEX. 
2 CAPEX after Average CAPEX reported between the event year (2004) and December 31, 2006, including the event year, considering only those observations for which there is non-missing value for CAPEX. 
3 R&D after Average R&D reported between the event year (2004) and December 31, 2006, including the event year, considering only those observations for which there is non-missing value for R&D. 
4 CAPEX plus R&D before Average of the sum of CAPEX and R&D reported between January 1, 2002 and the event year (2004), excluding the event year, considering only those observations for which there is non-missing values for both R&D and CAPEX. 
5 CAPEX before Average CAPEX reported between January 1, 2002 and the event year (2004), excluding the event year, considering only those observations for which there is non-missing value for CAPEX. 
6 R&D before Average R&D reported between January 1, 2002 and the event year (2004), excluding the event year, considering only those observations for which there is non-missing value for R&D. 
7 R&DI Equals [6]/[8]. 
8 Assets Assets in the event year (2004). 
9 Leverage Ratio Leverage Ratio in the event year (2004). 
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Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
The Table presents descriptive statistics for each variable of interest and controls, for the main (long-term analysis) sample. Panel 
A presents basic descriptive statistics. Panel B presents a correlation matrix. Panel C presents a t-test to the differences in means 
between MR and non-MR companies. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – basic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B – correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C – between group means differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Designation  Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
1 CAPEX plus R&D after  182 11.6 9.17 0.35 50.73 
2 CAPEX after  182 4.24 6.91 0.02 50.08 
3 R&D after  182 7.38 8.21 0 48.81 
4 CAPEX plus R&D before  182 11.3 9.21 0.09 44.20 
5 CAPEX before  182 3.89 5.94 0 37.57 
6 R&D before  182 7.41 8.42 0 40.36 
7 R&DI  182 0.15 0.20 0 0.975 
8 Assets  182 112 107 2.86 645.7 
9 Leverage Ratio  182 0.10 0.16 0 0.892 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 0.51***        
3 0.69*** -0.28***       
4 0.69*** 0.23*** 0.58***      
5 0.33*** 0.73*** -0.24*** 0.45***     
6 0.52*** -0.27*** 0.81*** 0.78*** -0.21***    
7 0.18** -0.34*** 0.49*** 0.36*** -0.31*** 0.60***   
8 0.26*** 0.60*** -0.22*** 0.22*** 0.62*** -0.20*** -0.44***  
9 0.11 0.45*** -0.25*** 0.13* 0.49*** -0.20*** -0.22*** 0.65*** 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Non-MR 72 8.52 4.34 4.21 8.04 3.42 4.62 0.13 95.7 0.10 
MR 110 13.6 4.18 9.45 13.4 4.20 9.23 0.16 124 0.10 
Difference  -5.12*** 0.16 -5.25*** -5.40*** -0.79 -4.61*** -0.04 -28.2* 0.00 
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Figure 2 – Trends in annual means – differences between groups 
The Figure presents the annual means of the variables of interest, around the event year (2004). Note that in each panel the 
observations are those available for the 182 companies in the main (long-term analysis) sample, for those companies that have 
non-missing values for all years (2002 to 2006). In black, MR companies. In white, non-MR companies. 
 
 
Panel A – CAPEX plus R&D 
 
 
 
 
Panel B – CAPEX  
 
 
 
 
Panel C – R&D 
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Table 4 – OLS results – focal dependent variables – main long-term analysis 
The table presents results for the focal dependent variables from OLS approach. Ybefore is the corresponding dependent variable 
measured before (and excluding) the event year (2004). MR is a dummy variable equal to one if the company filed a management 
report in 2004. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – OLS and second-stage IV 
Specification Without MR.R&DI With MR.R&DI 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -1.919587** (0.7488118) 
1.36252 
(0.9832975) 
-0.2967501 
(1.339995) 
-2.571218** 
(1.044792) 
0.2839871 
(1.010195) 
-2.060995 
(1.573386) 
R&DI -0.9874827 (1.254374) 
-2.320417 
(3.784041) 
-2.173618 
(4.296004) 
-3.269669** 
(1.604164) 
-6.052904* 
(3.2253) 
-8.33218** 
(3.924891) 
MR.R&DI    3.969426 (2.624617) 
6.802372* 
(3.754547) 
10.89552** 
(4.824401) 
Ybefore 0.6591339** (0.2711632) 
0.7180763*** 
(0.1028334) 
0.6715246*** 
(0.1128551) 
0.66385** 
(0.2701519) 
0.7111035*** 
(0.1001953) 
0.6677082*** 
(0.1086846) 
Assets 0.0111994 (0.0086446) 
0.0004986 
(0.0037967) 
0.0128465 
(0.0086213) 
0.0112485 
(0.0087015) 
0.0009008 
(0.0035689) 
0.0133959 
(0.0085876) 
Leverage ratio 0.4829434 (3.49564) 
-3.529772 
(2.536369) 
-3.538085 
(4.480416) 
-0.7751547 
(3.520206) 
-3.044121 
(2.429979) 
-2.671423 
(4.462904) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.6257 0.6930 0.5257 0.6266 0.6993 0.5407 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 
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Table 5 – IV results – focal dependent variables – main long-term analysis 
The table presents results for the focal dependent variables from IV approach. Ybefore is the corresponding dependent variable 
measured before (and excluding) the event year (2004). MR is the predicted treatment based on the first-stage regression. The IV 
estimation uses the instrument PFL752002, a dummy equal to one if the company public float was above $75 million in 2002. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – second-stage IV 
Specification Without MR.R&DI With MR.R&DI 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -5.366473*** (1.768703) 
-0.8948996 
(2.07621) 
-6.574427** 
(3.061102) 
-7.745526*** 
(2.502018) 
-2.680727 
(2.79754) 
-10.61478** 
(4.170464) 
R&DI 0.1979409 (1.814472) 
-2.555396 
(4.076757) 
-2.571936 
(5.054919) 
-10.00792*** 
(3.611927) 
-10.51793* 
(5.415004) 
-20.94136*** 
(7.704745) 
MR.R&DI    17.43365*** (5.806039) 
14.66095** 
(6.731214) 
32.4624*** 
(9.973644) 
Ybefore 0.7025287*** (0.2500443) 
0.7800878*** 
(0.1077383) 
0.7907841*** 
(0.1218928) 
0.7253993*** 
(0.2436506) 
0.7547796*** 
(0.0996082) 
0.7635757*** 
(0.1103086) 
Assets 0.0172037* (0.009921) 
0.0036345 
(0.0047891) 
0.0195743* 
(0.0108025) 
0.0172159* 
(0.0103757) 
0.0044105 
(0.0050411) 
0.0211783* 
(0.011795) 
Leverage ratio -2.031948 (3.665405) 
-4.607087 
(2.995848) 
-7.165451 
(5.229458) 
-0.8599279 
(3.852823) 
-3.6685 
(2.759732) 
-4.694465 
(5.22707) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms No No No No No No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.5371 0.6621 0.3752 0.5080 0.6642 0.2589 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 
 
Panel B – first-stage IV 
Dependent Variable  MR  MR 
PFL752002 0.4711756*** (0.0779356) 
0.4280121*** 
(0.0767117) 
0.4254543*** 
(0.0783202) 
0.3424738*** 
(0.0671679) 
0.3275424*** 
(0.0664091) 
0.322032*** 
(0.0673962) 
R&DI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MR.R&DI No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Ybefore Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Assets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leverage ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.2007 0.2340 0.2229 0.4370 0.4462 0.4446 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 
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Figure 3 – Estimated impact of SOX Section 404 on long-term investment by levels 
of R&D intensity 
The figure shows the estimated (IV) impact of MR on CAPEX plus R&D by levels of R&DI. 
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APPENDIX B – secondary figures and tables 
Table 6 – Robustness to dependent variables measurements – short-term analysis 
The Table is analogous to Tables 4 and 5 (full models), except that dependent variables of interest are defined for a narrower 
time window, just including the event year (2004). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; 
***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – OLS and second-stage IV 
Specification OLS IV 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -1.714883 (1.128775) 
1.219578 
(1.000276) 
-0.475052 
(1.737109) 
-5.608355** 
(2.25623) 
-4.281157 
(4.000095) 
-10.05637** 
(4.748717) 
R&DI -2.090817 (1.328782) 
-5.900201 
(4.26102) 
-8.012073* 
(4.6084) 
-6.714954** 
(2.758372) 
-13.77485 
(9.708319) 
-21.45171** 
(10.53637) 
MR.R&DI 3.624537 (2.948552) 
3.043189 
(4.664291) 
6.460598 
(5.485813) 
12.97723** 
(5.355377) 
16.19965* 
(9.042728) 
29.13403*** 
(11.06776) 
Ybefore 0.8248169*** (0.2884465) 
0.7266561*** 
(0.0919208) 
0.7341681*** 
(0.1016799) 
0.85998*** 
(0.2723585) 
0.797714*** 
(0.110592) 
0.8366288*** 
(0.1094686) 
Assets 0.0090494 (0.0092123) 
0.0064756 
(0.0065018) 
0.0172344 
(0.0117975) 
0.0127466 
(0.0099354) 
0.0109273 
(0.0103609) 
0.0231972 
(0.0151806) 
Leverage ratio -0.2817447 (2.771223) 
-5.853113 
(4.15033) 
-5.566074 
(5.637741) 
-0.9715009 
(3.247226) 
-6.097645 
(4.782441) 
-6.614037 
(6.707793) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.7264 0.4351 0.4224 0.6709 0.3832 0.2969 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 181 181 181 181 181 181 
 
Panel B – first-stage IV 
Dependent Variable    MR 
PFL752002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3466442*** 
(0.0678704) 
0.3297335*** 
(0.0671753) 
0.3241937*** 
(0.068369) 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4355 0.4441 0.4425 
Prob>F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 181 181 
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Table 7 – Robustness to dependent variables measurements – alternative long-term 
analysis 
The Table is analogous to Tables 4 and 5 (full models), except that dependent variables of interest are defined for a broader time 
window, including data till December 31, 2010. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; 
***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – OLS and second-stage IV 
Specification OLS IV 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -2.512081** (1.081836) 
0.6768071 
(1.179741) 
-1.543142 
(1.745173) 
-7.944831** 
(3.228988) 
-2.273438 
(3.051052) 
-10.53774** 
(5.049432) 
R&DI -2.214665 (1.675263) 
-7.543074* 
(4.372064) 
-8.086121 
(5.078583) 
-9.503849** 
(4.227326) 
-11.65693* 
(6.059563) 
-21.32298** 
(8.917034) 
MR.R&DI 2.394322 (2.875263) 
8.436142* 
(4.372064) 
11.20483** 
(5.574837) 
17.3808** 
(7.257576) 
15.93995** 
(7.928953) 
34.45413*** 
(12.42302) 
Ybefore 0.5723** (0.2763398) 
0.6706381*** 
(0.1116586) 
0.589794*** 
(0.1252033) 
0.636757*** 
(0.2402311) 
0.7219223*** 
(0.112644) 
0.6968344*** 
(0.1267657) 
Assets 0.0187573** (0.0090279) 
0.0028403 
(0.0042904) 
0.0215546** 
(0.0104075) 
0.0257522** 
(0.0116357) 
0.0060318 
(0.0053384) 
0.0301021** 
(0.0142055) 
Leverage ratio -0.0225027 (4.412029) 
-4.445079* 
(2.679626) 
-4.664553 
(5.463693) 
-2.086417 
(4.158034) 
-5.013966* 
(2.952468) 
-7.145398 
(5.841884) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.5366 0.6812 0.4491 0.4189 0.6450 0.2589 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 
 
Panel B – first-stage IV 
Dependent Variable    MR 
PFL752002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3424738*** 
(0.0671679) 
0.3275424*** 
(0.0664091) 
0.322032*** 
(0.0673962) 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4370 0.4462 0.4446 
Prob>F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 182 182 
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Table 8 – Robustness to R&DI measurement 
The Table is analogous to Tables 4 and 5 (full models), except that R&DI variable is defined by scaling R&D Before by the 
logarithm of sales (as opposed to assets) in the event year (2004), and that panel C presents the basic descriptive statistics for this 
alternative measure of R&DI. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – OLS and second-stage IV 
Specification OLS IV 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -2.008895*** (0.7528934) 
1.224948 
(0.9609053) 
-0.5414143 
(1.360538) 
-5.678583*** 
(1.891418) 
-1.651561 
(2.04735) 
-7.626845** 
(3.198813) 
R&DI -0.0033595 (0.0026933) 
-0.0076751 
(0.0049753) 
-0.0103154* 
(0.0054383) 
-0.0149743** 
(0.0059146) 
-0.0163296* 
(0.0090891) 
-0.0325226** 
(0.0131312) 
MR.R&DI 0.0033574 (0.0026932) 
0.0079929 
(0.0049066) 
0.0106443** 
(0.0053475) 
0.0150363** 
(0.0059305) 
0.0166355* 
(0.009043) 
0.032879** 
(0.0130973) 
Ybefore 0.6583723** (0.270825) 
0.6711602*** 
(0.0791023) 
0.6386621*** 
(0.0929009) 
0.7059084*** 
(0.2501321) 
0.7417963*** 
(0.084361) 
0.7661849*** 
(0.1067422) 
Assets 0.0118894 (0.0082506) 
0.0029635 
(0.0050039) 
0.0157595** 
(0.0079131) 
0.0171917* 
(0.0094157) 
0.0068355 
(0.0061251) 
0.0232795** 
(0.0105748) 
Leverage ratio 0.336501 (3.516726) 
-4.48779 
(2.892175) 
-4.210014 
(4.6448) 
-2.102607 
(3.693982) 
-5.693112 
(3.466856) 
-8.102108 
(5.568499) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.6254 0.7009 0.5351 0.5288 0.6576 0.3520 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 
 
Panel B – first-stage IV 
Dependent Variable    MR 
PFL752002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4652867*** 
(0.0800831) 
0.4276079*** 
(0.0769469) 
0.4176259*** 
(0.078441) 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1973 0.2497 0.2370 
Prob>F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 182 182 
 
 
Panel C – basic descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable  Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
R&DI  182 316.08 2581 0 29780 
! 103!
Table 9 – Robustness to the inclusion of additional controls 
The Table is analogous to Tables 4 and 5 (full models), except that we further include variables to control for profitability, 
growth opportunities and business complexity. Additional controls are CFO (cash flow from operations scaled by assets), MTB 
(market to book ratio), the number of Business Segments, and the number of Geographic Segments. Panel C presents the basic 
descriptive statistics for these. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
Panel A – OLS and second-stage IV 
Specification OLS IV 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -2.67036** (1.220407) 
0.3919551 
(0.9644397) 
-2.025048 
(1.706321) 
-8.756513*** 
(2.919434) 
-3.352158 
(2.792591) 
-12.05719*** 
(4.423977) 
R&DI -0.8605219 (2.687508) 
-8.937333*** 
(3.305788) 
-8.813417* 
(4.716292) 
-11.69649* 
(6.774934) 
-15.63091** 
(7.189762) 
-27.06882** 
(12.40522) 
MR.R&DI 5.885864* (3.288523) 
5.046523 
(4.337225) 
11.52211* 
(5.919032) 
23.68168*** 
(8.824243) 
16.46557* 
(8.529793) 
40.25562*** 
(14.05471) 
Ybefore 0.5974519** (0.2744172) 
0.6634866*** 
(0.1023783) 
0.6054523*** 
(0.1185285) 
0.6713015*** 
(0.2453281) 
0.696137*** 
(0.1000304) 
0.6816677*** 
(0.1164059) 
Assets 0.01228 (0.0094392) 
-0.0003347 
(0.0037231) 
0.0135786 
(0.0102622) 
0.0182253 
(0.0116178) 
0.0040621 
(0.0058974) 
0.0227754 
(0.0143239) 
Leverage ratio 4.023682 (4.697983) 
-3.188652 
(2.450558) 
0.2192605 
(5.63225) 
2.441921 
(4.852349) 
-3.599397 
(3.010932) 
-1.344798 
(6.182996) 
CFO 4.165073* (2.186671) 
-5.986975*** 
(2.129769) 
-1.753895 
(2.977504) 
4.251163* 
(2.542764) 
-5.358844** 
(2.123236) 
-1.148678 
(3.463199) 
MTB 0.0066135 (0.0042576) 
-0.0062826 
(0.0057079) 
0.0011449 
(0.0077257) 
0.0149434* 
(0.0088669) 
-0.0031835 
(0.0074118) 
0.011752 
(0.0139395) 
Business Segments -0.0270439 (0.3772479) 
-0.2220008 
(0.25476) 
-0.2577389 
(0.449432) 
-0.2701775 
(0.3824782) 
-0.3870018 
(0.3589036) 
-0.6554979 
(0.5550219) 
Geographic Segments 0.0539236 (0.2326069) 
0.1257415 
(0.1749766) 
0.1775833 
(0.2801413) 
0.2515184 
(0.3151542) 
0.2207935 
(0.2049075) 
0.467539 
(0.3992336) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.6273 0.6894 0.4984 0.4781 0.6372 0.2498 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 166 166 166 166 166 166 
 
Panel B – first-stage IV 
Dependent Variable    MR 
PFL752002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.3248799*** 
(0.0696693) 
0.321011*** 
(0.0692872) 
0.3168994*** 
(0.0702857) 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4218 0.4233 0.4235 
Prob>F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 166 166 
 
 
Panel C – basic descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable  Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
CFO  182 -0.06 0.25 -0.93 0.49 
MTB  166 5.43 27.0 0.43 347 
Business Segments  182 1.71 1.30 0 6 
Geographic Segments  182 2.08 1.90 0 13 
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Table 10 – Robustness to bandwidth 
The Table is analogous to Tables 4 and 5 (full models), except that we vary the bandwidth. Results from first stage are omitted 
but similar to those in Table 5. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – bandwidth $60-$90 million 
Specification OLS IV 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -1.184895 (0.8531355) 
1.137816 
(1.491564) 
0.287624 
(1.937238) 
-4.348328* 
(2.399502) 
-3.380399 
(3.723287) 
-7.847457* 
(4.418236) 
R&DI -3.15876* (1.884331) 
-15.31037** 
(6.00316) 
-16.96324*** 
(6.060289) 
-9.060428** 
(4.201893) 
-22.90996** 
(10.77138) 
-32.68151*** 
(12.16221) 
MR.R&DI 2.408066 (2.246929) 
8.837064 
(5.453936) 
11.32168* 
(6.222967) 
11.59637* 
(6.0078) 
18.52895** 
(8.905308) 
30.32694*** 
(10.98777) 
R2 0.7760 0.7105 0.6146 0.6959 0.6814 0.5127 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 
 
 
 
Panel B - bandwidth $40-$110 million 
Specification OLS IV 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  CAPEX  R&D 
CAPEX plus 
R&D  
MR -2.390027*** (0.9081219) 
-0.046005 
(1.121429) 
-2.02666 
(1.377162) 
-2.578843 
(2.204858) 
-0.1807708 
(1.615853) 
-2.125079 
(2.870259) 
R&DI 0.1251455 (0.8331279) 
-0.1969165 
(2.921784) 
1.685397 
(2.721629) 
-0.8834892 
(1.791488) 
-1.223917 
(3.438367) 
-0.2143828 
(4.042928) 
MR.R&DI 1.877226 (1.320484) 
-0.5131986 
(3.412144) 
2.50115 
(3.417048) 
3.674965 
(3.674965) 
1.284521 
(4.583412) 
5.748323 
(5.902166) 
R2 0.6297 0.6851 0.5953 0.6162 0.6725 0.5682 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 
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Table 11 – Robustness to approach 
The table presents results for the focal dependent variables, from Difference-in-Difference approach. Panel A and B present the 
results for model without and with the interaction of interest (After.MR.R&DI), respectively. After is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the observation corresponds to the period after 2004. Other variables, as before. Panel B further includes After.R&DI and 
MR.R&DI. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  *P<10%; **P<5%; ***P<1%. 
 
 
Panel A – without interaction of interest 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  
MR -0.2522697 (0.6739047) 
4.781163*** 
(1.143875) 
4.522544*** 
(1.354938) 
After 0.9201273 (0.7647868) 
-0.4153657 
(0.7462729) 
0.4881574 
(1.077373) 
After.MR -0.9427894 (0.9795549) 
0.636343 
(1.201523) 
-0.2732604 
(1.562165) 
R&DI 0.0440708 (0.9626845) 
20.18253*** 
(3.012181) 
20.22729*** 
(3.290023) 
Assets Yes Yes Yes 
Leverage ratio Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.5237 0.4845 0.3337 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 364 364 364 
 
 
Panel A – with interaction of interest 
Dependent Variable CAPEX  R&D CAPEX plus R&D  
MR -0.0969122 (1.510852) 
4.048027*** 
(1.265419) 
3.94383** 
(1.580155) 
After 1.510852 (1.048324) 
0.7708694 
(0.8461273) 
2.258748 
(1.325773) 
After.MR -1.414688 (1.452196) 
-0.0209551 
(1.367195) 
-1.396825 
(1.985414) 
After.MR.R&DI 3.967808 (3.615835) 
6.206486 
(9.946164) 
10.12821 
(10.6534) 
R&DI 2.105953 (1.550578) 
21.16886*** 
(7.332661) 
23.25681*** 
(7.690653) 
Assets Yes Yes Yes 
Leverage ratio Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
PFL terms Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.5259 0.4961 0.3495 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 364 364 364 
 
